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 The haredim in Israel are an ultra-Orthodox Jewish religious group who uphold 
the most conservative of Jewish laws. Instead of serving in the Israel Defense Forces 
(IDF) as all other Israelis do, the haredim are exempted from the IDF’s policy of 
universal conscription. This thesis proposes three hypotheses to determine why Israel’s 
haredim do not serve in the IDF. First, the haredim do not serve in the IDF because they 
do not want to; second, the haredim do not serve because they hold pacifistic political 
opinions; and third, the haredim do not serve because Jewish religious tradition forbids 
military service. To test these hypotheses, data were gathered by conducting a literature 
review and studying Israeli newspapers, official Israeli Government statistics, and 
unofficial public opinion surveys. Accordingly, a close examination of both the haredi 
worldview and the cultural characteristics of Israel’s haredi communities suggests that 
the haredim do not want to serve in the IDF for self-interested reasons. Furthermore, a 
survey of haredi political opinions indicates that the majority of haredim exhibit a 
hawkish and aggressive political orientation. Finally, an analysis of individual haredi 
voices reveals that haredi yeshiva students consider their Torah studies to be an integral 
component to Israel’s wartime activities. Contrary to the expectations of this thesis, 
haredi resistance to military service is not defined by an aversion to war or a commitment 
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 The Israel Defense Forces (IDF), charged with maintaining the security of Israeli 
citizens, has a glorious and complex history of repelling enemy attacks from outside 
Israel’s borders and neutralizing security threats from within. The method by which it 
fills its ranks is military conscription. While conscription is not a popular policy in many 
parts of the Western world, in Israel it has evolved into a powerful socializing instrument 
for shaping national identity. It is the product of historical consciousness, where the idea 
of survival is ingrained within every individual. Since its independence in 1948, Israel 
has engaged in numerous military conflicts. From the War of Independence (1947-1949), 
where the number of deaths exceeded 6,000, to the 1967 War (776 deaths), the War of 
Attrition (1968-1970: 1,424 deaths), the 1973 War (2,688 deaths), the First Lebanon War 
(1982-1985: 1,216 deaths), the Second Intifada (2000-2005: 328 deaths), the Second 
Lebanon War (2006: 117 deaths), and finally Operation Cast Lead (2008-2009: 10 
deaths), the State of Israel has lost a large proportion of its population to war.1 As the 
Jewish population of Israel is 5.59 million people, these battle casualties are a stark 
                                                
1 Jewish Virtual Library, “Israeli Casualties in Battle;” available from http://www.jewish 





reminder of the extreme costs that Israel accrues during violent conflicts.2 In spite of 
these risks, most 18-year-old Jewish Israelis willingly enlist in the IDF. 
  
IDF Conscription  
 The national conscription guidelines in Israel are as follows: all Jewish Israelis, 
male and female, are required to enlist in the IDF at the age of 18. After a period of 
regular duty (for men: 36 months, and for women: 21 months), all Jewish Israeli males 
serve up to 39 days per year in reserve duty until the age of 51.3 In addition to Jewish 
Israeli conscripts, the IDF drafts male members of Israel’s Druze and Circassian 
communities, whose numbers range in the hundreds. Male members of Israel’s Bedouin 
communities, as well as a few select Israeli Arab Christians, may volunteer for IDF 
service. They are accepted on a case-by-case basis. These conscription guidelines allow 
the IDF to field a force of 176,500 regulars on active duty and 445,000 in reserve, 
totaling 621,500 available soldiers.4 
 In recent time, the number of draft-age Jewish Israeli males who do not serve in 
the military has been growing. In 1980, the level of non-service was 12.1 percent; in 
1990, it was 16.6 percent; and in 2002, it was 23.9 percent. Of the 25 percent of draft-age 
Jewish Israeli males who did not serve in the IDF in 2007, 4 percent were residing abroad 
                                                
2 Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “Israel Celebrates 61 Years of Independence,” 27 April 2009; available 
from http://www.mfa.gov.il/MFA/MFAArchive/2000_2009/2009/Israel_celebrates_61_years_independenc 
e_28-Apr-2009.htm; Internet; accessed 23 May 2009. 
 
3 Jewish Virtual Library, “Israel Defense Forces (IDF) – An Introduction;” available from http://www. 
jewishvirtuallibrary.org/jsource/Society_&_Culture/IDF.html; Internet; accessed 19 February 2009. 
 
4 The Institute for National Security Studies, “Middle East Military Balance,” 11; available from 





when receiving their call to duty; 3 per cent possessed a criminal record; 2 percent 
suffered from a physical incapacity or premature death; and 5 percent displayed a 
‘psychological incompatibility,’ a softer term for ‘draft-dodging.’ The remaining 11 




 The purpose of the following research is to unravel the specific motivations of 
this final group of Jewish Israelis for avoiding military service. In short, this research 
question asks why haredi yeshiva students choose not to serve in the IDF. In an attempt 
to answer this research question, this thesis will test three hypotheses: first, haredi 
yeshiva students simply do not want to serve in the IDF. Historical, social and communal 
motives justify the rejection of service in state institutions such as the military. While the 
haredim want to enjoy living in the state, they refuse to defend it. Second, ultra-Orthodox 
yeshiva students advocate peace. They oppose wars and reject all forms of violence. 
Rejecting service in the IDF is a political gesture to demonstrate pacifism. Third, Jewish 
religious law clearly forbids Jews to engage in violence conflict. Strictly observant 
yeshiva students cannot subject themselves to service in an institution that is violent by 
its very nature. Judaism and militarism are simply irreconcilable. Ultimately, are IDF 
deferments for ultra-Orthodox haredi yeshiva students the product of a moral and/or 
spiritual conviction to avoid violent conflict, or the product of a motivation that seeks to 
                                                
5 Stuart A. Cohen, “The False ‘Crisis’ in Military Recruitment: An IDF Red Herring,” The Begin/Sadat 
Center for Strategic Studies, Perspectives Paper No. 33, 23 July 2007; available from http://www.biu.ac 




maximize their communal and social gain at the expense of sending other Israeli Jews to 
engage in violent conflict? 
 Viewed from a macro perspective, this research is both grounded in the field of 
conflict resolution and directly related to the larger Israeli-Palestinian conflict. For 
example, military conscription in Israel is, in and of itself, a conflict resolution 
mechanism. As will be explained later in this thesis, one of the founders’ primary 
motivations for introducing military conscription at the outset of the State of Israel was to 
create a civic institution capable of transcending the ethnic and cultural cleavages that 
existed within the immigrating Jewish Diaspora. Israel’s founders regarded the military 
as an instrument that would dilute the differences that existed among the newly arrived 
Jewish Israelis and give birth to an overarching sense of national identity. The same logic 
persists to this day; instead of exacerbating competing identities, military conscription in 
Israel serves to assuage conflicting needs and interests by instilling a sense of collective 
values and common ideals. 
 While military conscription serves to fashion a national Israeli identity, it also 
functions as Israel’s principal means of managing the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. For 
better or worse, Israel’s most frequent attempts at resolving the Israeli-Palestinian 
conflict involve the military. As such, it must field a massive military apparatus in order 
to address this conflict, and military conscription is a method that ensures that the 
military is never lacking for personnel. Through military conscription, Israel is always 
prepared to address the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, regardless of how great a sacrifice of 
its citizenry is necessary. 
 
5 
 In spite of the nationalizing effects of military conscription, the ultra-Orthodox 
haredi segments of Israeli society remain largely unaffected. For reasons examined in 
subsequent chapters of this thesis, Israel’s haredi communities have traditionally resisted 
the trends of popular Jewish Israeli culture in favor of a cloistered lifestyle and 
vociferously denounced what they perceived as the secularizing tide of contemporary 
Israeli society. With this information in mind, Israel’s founders publicly agreed to exempt 
a specified number of haredi yeshiva students from military conscription so that they 
could dedicate all of their energy to reviving the ultra-Orthodox haredi religious 
traditions that had almost been completely decimated by the Holocaust. Yet privately, the 
founders acquiesced to this arrangement in order to secure the silence of the haredi 
leaders who adamantly objected to the notion of Israeli statehood. Thus, the policy of 
haredi yeshiva student military exemptions began as a method of conflict prevention and 
mitigation. Had Israel’s leaders refused to make this concession, they would have most 
certainly faced an extraordinarily high level of opposition to the establishment of the 
State of Israel from the haredim, placing them not only in conflict with neighboring 
Arabs and other anti-Zionists, but also with an important contingent of Palestinian Jewry. 
At every escalation of the numbers of exempted haredim since then, Israel’s leaders 
consented in part because they sought to avoid an inflammation of intra-Jewish conflict. 
 The policy of haredi yeshiva student exemptions, however, has not been without 
consequences, as it affects the Israeli-Palestinian conflict in two problematic areas. First, 
the numbers of exempted haredi yeshiva students has skyrocketed to over 50,000 young 
men, a staggeringly high proportion to the overall number of conscripted Jewish Israelis. 
According to sources within the IDF, Israel’s military apparatus will encounter a 
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dangerously low level of troops if this policy is allowed to continue at its current pace. 
Because Israel tends to utilize its military to resolve the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, its 
leaders could find themselves unable to defend the country and resolve the conflict if 
exorbitant numbers of Jewish Israelis are increasingly allowed to forego military service. 
Second, this policy unnecessarily adds tension to an already perilous conflict by pitting 
Jews against Jews, thereby inhibiting the emergence of a united Jewish effort focused on 
meaningfully addressing the larger Israeli-Palestinian conflict. A large portion of Jewish 
Israelis who willingly submit to military service take umbrage at the fact that a certain 
social group in Israel is lawfully permitted to avoid military service. To these detractors, 
a feeling exists that the Israeli government favors one segment of Jewish Israelis over the 
rest of the population and sends the majority of Jewish Israelis into the battle to fight on 
behalf of the haredim. As a result, a great animosity exists between the haredim and 
mainstream Jewish society, which indirectly affects the Israeli-Palestinian conflict by 
hampering the chances that these very different demographic groups will come together 
and agree to approach the conflict as an undivided Jewish front. 
 Due to the contentious nature of this policy, this research question will be 
analyzed through the lens of three hypotheses that are wholly based in the field of 
conflict resolution. The first hypothesis – that haredi yeshiva students do not serve in the 
military because they simply do not want to – purports that haredi non-service is the 
result of a personal aversion to conflict. In this scenario, haredi yeshiva students 
individually disagree with Israel’s traditional method of conflict resolution – specifically, 
a military solution – and do not want to be party to its violent tactics. Thus, by steering 
clear of military service, they effectively avoid engaging in violent conflict. The second 
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hypothesis alleges that haredi yeshiva students avoid military service because they 
project a pacifistic political ideology. They politically oppose all forms of violent 
conflict, and their non-service is a political act intended to represent their opposition to 
violent methods of conflict resolution in favor of a peaceful and diplomatic approach. 
Violence, in this view, is at all times politically indefensible. The final hypothesis posits 
that haredi yeshiva students justify their non-service on religious grounds. As ultra-
conservative adherents to the Jewish religious tradition, haredi yeshiva students are 
religiously prohibited from participating in war and directed to find peaceful solutions to 
potentially violent conflicts. From this argument, it follows that the Jewish people are not 
warmongers, but are instead, representatives of peace. While these three hypotheses are 
certainly not mutually exclusive, the examination of each one will offer an opportunity to 
decipher the true motivations of these yeshiva students and thus submit the soundest and 
most nuanced final judgment.  
 If there is truth to any of these hypotheses, they may represent a minor but 
important shift away from aggressive Jewish Israeli attitudes toward the Israeli-
Palestinian conflict. As was previously explained, each of these hypotheses assumes that 
haredi yeshiva students avoid military service for a specific reason related to conflict 
resolution. Should evidence surface that any of these justifications are legitimate, it 
would necessarily cast Israel’s haredi communities in a favorable light. But what if these 
pacifistic feelings and opinions are not exclusive to the haredim, but are merely more 
apparent in these communities due to their military exemptions? What if haredi peaceful 
perspectives are an indicator of wider social trends permeating Jewish Israeli society as a 
whole? Do most young Jewish Israelis, for instance, wish to avoid engaging in the 
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violence that is indicative of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict? Would they rather spend 
their time after high school in the pursuit of goals unrelated to the military? Do these 
same youngsters hold pacifistic political viewpoints, and therefore support a peaceful 
resolution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict? And are there traditional Jewish principles 
that less religious Jewish Israelis can look to for guidance in resolving the Israeli-
Palestinian conflict? To be sure, all of this is pure speculation, but the potential for 
changing attitudes should not be ignored. If any of these hypotheses are true of haredi 
motivations for not serving in the military, they may very well serve as a model for other 
Jewish Israelis to emulate. At that point, the world may begin to witness a renewed 
commitment to a peaceful resolution for the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.  
 
History of Haredi Yeshiva Student Exemptions 
 The military exemption of haredi yeshiva students has a long history. With the 
impending invasion of Arab armies in 1948, David Ben-Gurion, the first Prime Minister 
of the State of Israel, consolidated the various Jewish underground militias into the IDF 
and instituted a policy of national conscription to fill its ranks. As Jewish refugees from 
Eastern Europe began pouring into the fledgling state, leaders of the ultra-Orthodox 
communities pleaded with Ben-Gurion to exempt their most promising Torah scholars 
from military service. These leaders, most notably the Hazon Ish and Rabbi Elazar 
Schach, argued that the Holocaust had decimated the ultra-Orthodox communities, and 
these communities were in desperate need of scholars to resuscitate their traditions. Ben-
Gurion acquiesced and permitted the exemption of 400 scholars who could avoid military 
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service and study in the yeshivas.6 Ben-Gurion’s reasoning for introducing this policy 
was not, however, limited to his sympathy with the plight of the haredi communities. 
True, Ben-Gurion recognized that the Holocaust had eradicated almost four-fifths of the 
haredim in Eastern Europe, and he sincerely wanted to provide an environment in Israel 
where they could restore their traditions.7 But Ben-Gurion was also a shrewd pragmatist. 
He understood that the various segments of the haredi community shared an 
overwhelming antipathy toward Zionism and the establishment of an independent Jewish 
state through means other than the coming of the Messiah. In order to silence haredi 
opposition to the recommendations of the Anglo-American Committee of Inquiry, which 
was deliberating over the future of Palestine in 1946, Ben-Gurion negotiated a number of 
religious concessions with haredi leaders, one of which would eventually lead to the 
exemption of 400 yeshiva students from IDF conscription.8 
 The total number of yeshiva exemptions was held at approximately 400 until 
1975, when then Minister of Defense Shimon Peres raised the quota to 800. When the 
Likud Party won its landmark electoral victory in 1977, its leaders convinced the haredi 
political party, Agudat Israel, to join the governing coalition.9 Part of the coalition 
agreement included a stipulation to eliminate the ceiling of yeshiva student exemptions 
by broadening the criteria for exemption to include not only students for whom Torato 
                                                
 
6 Nurit Stadler, “Playing with Sacred/Corporeal Identities: Yeshiva Students’ Fantasies of Military 
Participation,” Jewish Social Studies: History, Culture, Society 13, no. 2 (Winter 2007): 158. 
 
7 Donna Rosenthal, The Israelis: Ordinary People in an Extraordinary Land (New York: Free Press, 
2003), 176. 
 
8 Stuart A. Cohen, Israel and Its Army: From Cohesion to Confusion (New York: Routledge, 2008), 131. 
 
9 Menachem Hofnung, “Ethnicity, Religion and Politics in Applying Israel’s Conscription Law,” Law and 
Policy 17, no. 3 (July 1995): 324-325. 
 
10 
Omanuto (“Torah is his profession”) applies but also ‘born-again’ – or newly religious –
Jews as well as teachers and graduates of the haredi independent school system.10 As a 
result, haredi deferrals immediately increased to 8,257 in 1977.11 In the following 
decades, the number of haredi deferrals exploded. In 1987, 17,017 draft-age yeshiva 
students were deferred; 28,772 were deferred in 1997; and 41,450 yeshiva students were 
deferred in 2005.12 In 2008, the number of deferred haredi yeshiva students skyrocketed 
to 55,300.13 In terms of proportion to the overall pool of draft-age Jewish Israeli recruits, 
deferred haredi yeshiva students accounted for 3.7 percent in 1980; 4.6 percent in 1990; 9 
percent in 2000; and 11.2 percent in 2007.14 According to IDF officials, the rate of haredi 
yeshiva student deferments will increase to 25 percent of all 18-year-old Jewish Israeli 
males by the year 2020 if the policy continues at its current pace.15 
 The policy of haredi yeshiva student deferrals is based on Section 36(3) of the 
Defense Service Law (1986). This law grants the Minister of Defense the authority to 
grant deferrals to individuals, “…for reasons related to the size of the regular forces or 
reserve forces of the Israel Defense Forces or for reasons related to the requirements of 
                                                
10 Steven V. Mazie, Israel’s Higher Law: Religion and Democracy in the Jewish State (New York: 
Lexington Books, 2006), 189. 
 
11 Cohen, Israel and Its Army, 131. 
 
12 Mazie, Israel’s Higher Law, 189. 
 
13 Ilan Shahar, “More and More Yeshiva Students Choosing Torah over IDF Service,” Ha’aretz, 31 July 
2008; available from http://www.haaretz.com/hasen/spages/1007085.html; Internet; accessed 19 February 
2009. 
 
14 Cohen, “The False ‘Crisis’” and Hanan Greenberg, “Barak Refuses to Exempt 1,000 Haredim from IDF 
Service,” YnetNews.com, 6 March 2008; available from http://www.ynetnews.com/articles/0,7340,L-
3515582,00.html; Internet; accessed 4 May 2009. 
 
15 Ilan Shahar, “Only 80 Yeshiva Students Opted for National Service in the Past Year,” Ha’aretz, 5 June 





education, security, settlement or the national economy or for family or other reasons.”16 
The yeshiva student receives his military service deferral in the following way: when he 
reaches the age of conscription, he must obtain a recommendation for deferral from the 
head of his yeshiva and then submit an annual application for deferment to the Minster of 
Defense, who then approves the request on a case-by-case basis.17 If the applicant is 
enrolled in full-time yeshiva study, his application is normally approved. After the haredi 
yeshiva student has been successfully deferred for a number of years, he eventually 
reaches an age for which the conscription guidelines no longer apply. At this point, he 
achieves a permanent exemption from military service.18 
 For almost four decades, the policy of yeshiva student deferment has been 
challenged in Israel’s Supreme Court. Beginning with Becker v. Minister of Defense 
(1970), most cases were dismissed on the basis that the petitioners had no standing to 
come before the court.19 Nevertheless, the Court’s refusal to rule on this matter changed 
on December 9, 1998, when the Court issued its judgment concerning Rubinstein v. 
Minister of Defense. Writing on behalf of the unanimous opinion of the Court, President 
of the Supreme Court, Aharon Barak, ruled: 
Although the Court has upheld the administrative arrangement in the past, 
relying on a statutory provision authorizing the Defense Minister to grant 
exemptions “for other reasons,” the growing number of students covered 
by the exemption has pushed it beyond his authority…At a certain point, 
                                                
16 Mazie, Israel’s Higher Law, 189. 
 
17 Israel Shahak and Norton Mezvinsky, Jewish Fundamentalism in Israel: New Edition (London: Pluto 
Press, 2004), 29. 
 
18 Hofnung, “Ethnicity, Religion and Politics,” 324. 
 




quantity becomes quality. The Defense Minister’s current practice of 
granting deferrals and exemptions is invalid.20 
 
With this ruling, the Court declared this practice, which had existed since the earliest 
days of the Jewish state, illegal. It did not, however, provide any recommendations to 
remedy the situation. Instead, it directed the Knesset to convene and propose new 
legislation. Barak concluded: 
The Defense Minister or the Knesset should be allowed to conduct a 
serious and organized discussion regarding the entire issue and all of its 
ramifications…We must postpone the impat [sic] of our decision. With 
respect to our authority to do so…we have reached the conclusion that the 
appropriate period of postponement is twelve months from the day this 
judgment is rendered, i.e. until December 9, 1999.21 
 
Nearly nine months later, on August 23, 1999, then Prime Minster Ehud Barak tapped 
retired Justice Zvi Tal to preside over a ten-person commission, assembled to draft new 
legislation concerning yeshiva deferrals and present it to the Knesset.22 
  
The Tal Law 
 As the Tal Commission deliberated, the IDF began to take steps of its own to 
integrate young haredi males into the military. In consultation with haredi rabbis, Major 
General Yehuda Segev, then Commanding Officer of the IDF’s Manpower Branch, 
launched Battalion 97, or the Netzach Yehuda Battalion, in 1999.23 Commonly known as 
Nahal Haredi, this battalion is a segregated unit that allows young haredi men to 
                                                
20 Rubinstein v. Minister of Defense, H.C. 3267/97, 715/98 (1998), 2. 
 
21 Ibid., 65. 
 
22 Mazie, Israel’s Higher Law, 190. 
 




participate in military activities while remaining true to their religious requirements. 
Nahal’s website advertises the battalion’s mission statement, stating that the regiment 
offers, 
To provide for the unique spiritual needs of Haredi [sic] youth, while also 
enabling them to participate in the defense of Israel…To provide these 
young men with the educational and professional qualifications needed to 
achieve economic independence…To provide the Haredi [sic] community 
with a unique opportunity to share the nation’s military burden as well as 
bridging the social gap between the secular and religious populations in 
Israel.24 
 
In accordance with ultra-Orthodox religious practice, Nahal soldiers are protected from 
contact with female soldiers,  afforded daily opportunities for prayer and Torah study, 
and allowed contact with their community rabbis.25 During their period of enlistment, 
some Nahal soldiers serve in combat units, while others perform religious functions for 
the IDF such as ensuring kosher standards and administering death rituals.26 Despite its 
establishment, Nahal Haredi did not become a viable option for haredi youths until the 
Tal Commission presented its proposal, and even then, it was met with limited success. 
 In March 2000, the Tal Commission delivered its conclusions. Its report began by 
recommending that yeshiva student deferrals continue without a ceiling. These deferrals 
did, however, include a stipulation. Although 18-year-old yeshiva students would remain 
deferred, the Tal Commission recommended that these students take an optional ‘decision 
year’ upon reaching the age of 22. During this year, yeshiva students would be free to 
                                                
24 Nahal Haredi, “Mission Statement;” available from http://www.nahalharedi.org/nahal_haredi_mission 
_statement.php; Internet; accessed 4 April 2009. 
 
25 Cohen, Israel and Its Army, 132-133 and Nurit Stadler, Edna Lomsky-Feder and Eyal Ben-Ari, 
“Fundamentalism’s Encounters with Citizenship: the Haredim in Israel,” Citizenship Studies 12, no. 3 (June 
2008): 222. 
 




enter the labor market or enroll in educational or vocational training without fear of being 
conscripted. After the decision year, yeshiva students could choose from one of three 
options. First, these haredim could return to their yeshivas and remain deferred. Second, 
they could enlist in the IDF for a reduced term of service for four months, after which 
they would serve in the reserves, thus making them eligible to legally pursue 
employment. Third, they could volunteer for one year of civil service, such as in 
paramedic and firefighting units or in local departments of social services, which would 
also permit them to work and free them from the prospects of being drafted.27 Two years 
later, in July 2002, the Knesset passed the Tal Commission’s proposal by a vote of 51 in 
favor, 41 opposed, 5 abstentions and 22 absent, allowing the new law a five-year trial 
period.28 
 Following the ratification of the Tal Law, a large bloc consisting of the Movement 
for Quality Government, the Meretz and Shinui political parties, and private attorney 
Yehuda Ressler, presented petitions to the Supreme Court, alleging that the law violated 
Israel’s Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty. This bloc argued that the Tal Law 
contravened the Basic Law’s principle of equality by forcing the majority of Jewish 
Israelis to bear the burden of military service while allowing the haredi communities to 
avoid service altogether. Four years later, the Court rejected these petitions. Supreme 
Court President Barak stated: 
                                                
27 Dan Izenberg, “Halutz Opposes Court Ruling on Tal Law,” Jerusalem Post, 11 May 2006; available 
from http://www.jpost.com/servlet/Satellite?pagename=JPost/JPArticle/ShowFull&cid=1145961322633; 
Internet; accessed 5 May 2009 and Matthew Wagner, “Tal Law Implementation Days Away,” Jerusalem 
Post, 2 July 2007; available from http://www.jpost.com/servlet.Satellite?cid=1183053087104&pagename 
=JPost/JPArticle/ShowFull; Internet; accessed 5 May 2009. 
 
28 Cohen, Israel and Its Army, 132. 
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Alongside our decision that the petitions are rejected, because at this point 
in time we cannot determine that the law is unconstitutional, there is 
reason for concern that the Military Deferment Law [as it is formally 
named] will become unconstitutional. Indeed, our ruling today is that the 
Military Deferment Law is not yet unconstitutional, but there is cause for 
concern that it will become so unless there is a significant improvement in 
the results it has achieved [so far] in practice.29 
 
Even though the Court ruled that the Tal Law was not unconstitutional, it nevertheless 
admitted that the law did, in fact, violate the Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty. 
They deemed that this discrepancy was tolerable because the Tal Law was “…for a 
worthy purpose and in keeping with the values of Israel as a Jewish and democratic 
state.”30 Moreover, the Court admonished both the IDF and the government for failing to 
provide adequate and attractive options to haredi yeshiva students who wanted to take the 
decision year. The Court concluded its opinion by threatening to terminate the law by the 
end of its trial period if it did not produce evidence of demonstrable progress.31 
 By mid-July 2007, the Tal Law had yielded mixed results. Many haredi yeshiva 
students had chosen to take the decision year. Yet, their numbers were a small fraction of 
the overall draft-age pool of haredi males. As of December 9, 2005, the state reported 
that 1,432 yeshiva students took the decision year, and only 618 of those students 
participated for the entire year. A mere 74 yeshiva students chose to join the army and 
103 chose civil service.32 In 2007, the number of haredim who joined the IDF was only 
                                                










353.33 Despite these numbers, Nahal Haredi currently reports that the battalion consists 
of almost 1,000 soldiers.34 According to other sources, this number is misleading, 
because more than half of this number is composed of national-religious soldiers who 
joined Nahal because they were “…attracted by its more stringently orthodox 
ambience.”35 Despite these diminutive numbers, the Knesset’s Foreign Affairs and 
Defense Committee recommended that the Tal Law be extended by five more years. On 
July 18, 2007, the Knesset approved this extension by a vote of 56 in favor, 9 opposed 
and 2 abstentions.36 
 In closing, a word from David Ben-Gurion is appropriate. Ten years after he 
granted the first 400 military exemptions to haredi yeshiva students, he had second 
thoughts. In 1958, he wrote: 
After the founding of the state, the sages came to me and told me: all 
centers of learning in the Diaspora were destroyed and this is the only 
country where some yeshivot were left. There are only a handful of 
students, so they should be exempted from military service. I considered 
their request…and gave orders to exempt yeshiva students. Things have 
changed since then: there are many religious students here and 
abroad…The mother who lost her son may say: maybe if there had been 
more soldiers with my boy, he would not have died…I suggest that you 
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Studies have indicated that, in Jewish communities in the past (especially 
among East European Jewish communities), only a handful of prodigies, 
members of a select elite, dedicated their lives to the pursuit of 
knowledge.38 
 
Why, then, are haredi yeshiva students avoiding military service in contemporary Israel 
in record numbers? 
 
Methodology 
 This thesis employs a historical/policy evaluative methodology to analyze the 
strengths and weaknesses of the hypotheses. This particular methodology was chosen for 
two primary reasons: first, it is necessary to assess the extent to which the policy of 
haredi yeshiva student military exemptions has or has not deviated from the beliefs and 
goals of the leading actors who instituted it more the fifty years ago. If it has strayed from 
their original intentions, this methodology will help determine what factors forced this 
policy away from following its projected track. In so doing, this methodology will clarify 
how the three variables laid out in the hypotheses – personal motives, political views and 
religious observance – have shaped the trajectory of this policy, for better or for worse. 
Second, this methodology will provide the opportunity to pinpoint what, if any, political, 
social and cultural ramifications this policy has introduced to the Israeli body politic. If 
the effects of this policy are minimal, this methodology will help explain how the policy 
has been smoothly and amenably integrated into contemporary Israeli society. If, 
however, this policy has engendered controversy and resistance, this methodology will 
                                                




present a chance to consider the ways in which this policy contributes to intra-Jewish 
conflict in the State of Israel. 
 The data collected for this thesis are both extensive and diverse, comprising a 
literature review, online newspaper articles, official State of Israel statistics and unofficial 
public opinion surveys. The literature review touches on such issues as civil-military 
relations, the nature and structure of the IDF, Jewish religious tradition, Israel’s ultra-
Orthodox haredi communities, and conscientious objection in Israel. Although several 
authors are reviewed, three specific authors deserve special attention for their 
contribution to this thesis. Nurit Stadler, senior lecturer at the Department of Sociology 
and Anthropology at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem, provides a rare and much-
needed perspective of haredi views of military service. Her specialization in the fields of 
religious fundamentalism and ultra-Orthodoxy in Israel shines in the such essays as, 
“Fundamentalism’s Encounters with Citizenship: the Haredim in Israel,” “Other-Worldly 
Soldiers? Ultra-Orthodox Views of Military Service in Israel,” and “Playing with 
Sacred/Corporeal Identities: Yeshiva Students’ Fantasies of Military Participation.”  
Moreover, Stuart A. Cohen, Professor of Political Science at Bar-Ilan University and 
Chair of the academic council of the Begin-Sadat Center for Strategic Studies, offers a 
valuable and unbiased appraisal of the relationship between the IDF and Israeli society as 
well as IDF manpower policies in his publications entitled, “The False ‘Crisis’ in Military 
Recruitment: An IDF Red Herring,” “Tensions Between Military Service and Jewish 
Orthodoxy in Israel: Implications Imagined and Real,” and Israel and Its Army: From 
Cohesion to Confusion. Finally, Menachem Friedman, Emeritus Professor of Sociology 
at Bar-Ilan University, utilizes his expertise in the fields of secularization and 
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confrontation between religious and non-religious Jewish groups and the processes of 
extremism and zealotry to present a pointed and unique portrait of haredi views of 
conflict and violence. His essays, “Haredi Violence in Contemporary Society” and 
“Haredim and Palestinians in Jerusalem,” are unmatched in their originality and attention 
to detail. Without the insights of these authors, this thesis would have had tremendous 
difficulty getting off of the ground. 
 In addition to the literature review, online Israeli newspaper articles provided up-
to-date opinions and statistics. Three well-read and respected online Israeli newspapers, 
Ynetnews, The Jerusalem Post and Ha’aretz, provided the bulk of these articles. 
Ynetnews is the online English version of Israel’s most popular newspaper, Yedioth 
Ahronoth, and it is a largely independent/moderate newspaper that provides both left- and 
right-wing views. The reports from one of its journalists, Hanan Greenberg, offer the 
opinions of non-haredi Israelis regarding the policy of haredi military deferrals. In 
addition, The Jerusalem Post, a historically conservative newspaper, presents its readers 
with new developments in this policy debate, including strong coverage of recent 
government decisions concerning the Tal Law. Lastly, Ha’aretz, recognized as Israel’s 
liberal media outlet, submits current statistics on haredi yeshiva student military deferrals 
and conveys an anti-Tal Law sentiment through one of its reporters, Ilan Shahar. Taken 
together, the reportage of these newspapers complements the literature review by adding 
a ‘breaking news’ dimension to this policy debate. 
 Many of the statistics central to this thesis were gathered from official State of 
Israel websites. The websites for the Knesset, the Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs and 
the Central Bureau of Statistics provided much-needed demographic and political data. 
 
20 
Other statistics, such as information regarding the military capabilities and manpower 
make-up of the IDF, were provided by the websites of Nahal Haredi and the Institute for 
National Security Studies. Supplementary statistics were provided by Stuart A. Cohen’s 
study, “The False ‘Crisis’ in Military Recruitment: An IDF Red Herring,” which was 
sponsored by the Begin-Sadat Center for Strategic Studies. In this invaluable essay, 
Cohen supplies the current rates of non-service of non-haredi young Israeli males as well 
as the proportion of haredi non-enlistment to the overall draft-age Jewish Israeli male 
population over the past three decades. 
 Beyond statistics, public opinion surveys constitute a considerable portion of this 
research. These surveys were used to determine the political attitudes of the haredi 
communities in Israel vis-à-vis the conflict with the Palestinians and to highlight the 
political differences between the haredim and other non-ultra-Orthodox Jewish groups in 
Israel. The most comprehensive surveys come from the Institute for National Security 
Studies, which produces an annual compendium of Israeli public opinion on national 
security. The surveys from 2001, 2003 and 2005-2007 offer detailed summaries of Israeli 
public opinion based on a sliding scale of religious observance, from those who observe 
all Jewish religious traditions (ultra-Orthodox) to those who practice no Jewish religious 
traditions (secular). The findings from all surveys utilized in this thesis will provide an 
occasion to analyze the extent to which Israel’s haredi communities advocate either an 
escalation or a resolution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. More significantly, these 
findings will make it possible to judge how these political opinions correlate with the 




Chapter Two  
–  
The Significance of IDF Service
 
 
 A thorough examination of the phenomenon of mass IDF deferrals for ultra-
Orthodox yeshiva students would be incomplete without a brief discussion of the role that 
the IDF plays in modern Israeli society. This chapter explores the nature of civil-military 
relations in Israel and focuses primarily on the significance of obligatory military service 
for Israel’s Jewish population, especially as it relates to the development of a collective 
national identity. It then analyzes the potential negative consequences of non-service in 
terms of social mobility and economic development. Moreover, it attempts to gauge the 
reaction of non-haredi Jewish Israelis to this policy of mass IDF deferrals for ultra-
Orthodox yeshiva students. Finally, this chapter concludes by providing an in-depth 
analysis of the level of conflict engendered among the disparate Jewish elements of 
Israeli society as a by-product of this policy of haredi non-enlistment. 
   
Dawn of National Conscription 
 When the Jewish leaders of the Yishuv declared independence for the State of 
Israel in 1948, they did so, in part, to attract the global Jewish Diaspora to immigrate to 
the nascent Jewish state. As was the case then and now, the various communities of the 
Jewish Diaspora constituted a veritable ‘melting-pot’ of identities, cultures and values. 
Upon arrival to the Jewish state, these immigrant communities did not shed their 
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distinguishing characteristics, but they instead entrenched themselves among similar 
immigrants and created sub-communities within the fledgling Israeli polity. 
Consequently, the various communities of the early Jewish state shared few common 
traits with each other, except, of course, for their Jewish ethnicity and/or religious 
practices. 
 While the Jewish communities of the early Jewish state possessed few 
commonalities, they nevertheless found themselves drawn together in defense of the 
nation during their war for independence in 1948. Because the attacking Arab armies 
vastly outnumbered the Jewish population in 1948, it was incumbent upon the majority of 
the newly minted Israeli Jews to join ranks and contribute to the defense effort. 
 This first major violent conflict for the State of Israel provided Israeli leaders with 
the opportunity to integrate Israel’s various Jewish communities into an inclusive 
collective. When Prime Minister David Ben-Gurion established the policy of universal 
conscription for the IDF, his reasoning surpassed the basic need to gather fighters to 
defend the young nation during its war for independence. From the outset, Ben-Gurion 
believed that few other national institutions could more successfully integrate the 
disparate Jewish communities into Israeli society than the military. He wrote:  
Our soldier is first and foremost a citizen, in the fullest meaning of that 
term. A citizen belonging to his [or her] homeland, to the history of the 
nation, its culture and language…[The military] is the state institution 
where all cleavages: ethnic, political, class-based or of any other sort, 
vanish. Each soldier is equal to his companion in status.39 
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More than sixty years later, Ben-Gurion’s statement still carries weight. As will be shown 
later in this chapter, military service in Israel has not only served to integrate the various 
Jewish communities in Israel, but it has also come to be defined as the Jewish Israeli’s 
most sacred civic duty, conferring upon those who serve with a range of rights and 
privileges. 
 
Civil-Military Relations in Israel  
 Before moving to the discussion about the significance of military service in 
Israel, it is important to note that Ben-Gurion’s reasoning about the integrative nature of 
military service was by no means novel. To be sure, Ben-Gurion drew on the historical 
lesson that wars and military service have a binding effect on societies, idealized in both 
William James’ notion that, “[wars are] the gory nurse that trained societies to 
cohesiveness,” and Hegel’s assertion that military service is the, “ultimate expression of 
the individual’s recognition of his membership [in] the ethical community of the state.”40  
 In his book, Fighting for Rights: Military Service and the Politics of Citizenship, 
Ronald R. Krebs explores the notion that a nation’s military generates powerful 
expressions of the citizens’ collective allegiance to, and ownership of, the state. He 
contends that, through military service, citizens of the state gather together and discover 
through their aggregate efforts that they are equal and integral parts of an undertaking 
much greater than their distinct communities.  
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The armed forces…bring together individuals of various backgrounds in 
common cause and in a collaborative spirit, providing a setting seemingly 
well-suited to breaking down dividing lines based on race, ethnicity, 
religion, or class…[and] they…emerge cognizant that they [are] 
constitutive pieces of a larger project.41 
 
While serving in the military, individuals come into contact with myriad ethnicities and 
cultures, but instead of exacerbating these differences, the military fosters a new set of 
values to which every individual soldier can ascribe. Shared military service during times 
of war and peace allows individuals to transcend identity cleavages and realize a new 
sense of belonging – membership in a greater collective that is the nation. 
 From the time of Israel’s war for independence, Israel’s existence has been 
defined by conflict, from large-scale wars to low-intensity struggles. In fact,  
Israel has been involved in more wars since World War II than any other 
country in the world. Some Israelis perceive the brief history of their state 
as one long war punctuated by occasional cease-fires and lulls in acts of 
terrorism.42  
 
In a country roughly the size of New Jersey, few Israeli Jews have been able to find 
respite from the effects of frequent violent conflict. Unfortunately for Israeli Jews, many 
have come to perceive their country in terms of this well-known mantra: “all citizens are 
soldiers and the entire state is the front line.”43 
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Social and Economic Aspects of Military Service 
 As mentioned previously, military service in Israel is considered the most sacred 
civic obligation. There is no greater duty than sacrificing one’s life in defense of the state. 
Consequently, IDF service confers enormous advantages to those individuals who present 
themselves to the state. In many ways, IDF service defines an individual’s status within 
Israeli society. Asher Arian notes that this status-building can start as early as 
adolescence, as teenagers begin to dream about the military unit in which they wish to 
serve.44 Gabriel Ben-Dor and Ami Pedahzur further this argument by writing that the 
most valuable opportunities for employment and higher education come only to those 
Israelis who have dedicated a significant portion of their adult lives to IDF service.45 
Myron J. Aronoff even goes as far as claiming that families and communities whose 
members suffer a high proportion of casualties during military service are elevated to a 
higher status within society.46 Indeed, it would not be hyperbole to claim that IDF service 
is the most indispensable tool for achieving upward mobility within Israeli society. 
 Since the IDF has an official policy of universal conscription, it would seem that 
every Israeli has the same opportunity to achieve success and stature in Israeli society. 
However, as has been explained, there are many social and ethnic groups in Israel that do 
not share in the burden of military service. While these groups certainly enjoy the benefit 
of not having to risk losing their lives during war, their non-service has worked to place 
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them at the margins of society, allowing those Israelis who do serve to question their 
dedication to, or merit for, membership in the state.47 Ayelet Shachar writes, 
In a country like Israel, where identity and group membership matter 
significantly and where wars and armed confrontations are still, for 
various exogenous and endogenous reasons, a real threat, military service 
has become an obvious demarcating tool for distinguishing between 
members of the same polity – that is, between those who truly belong to 
the republic and those who are entitled to the rights of citizenship in the 
state but are conceived as less than full members of the political 
community because they do not partake in its most fundamental 
expressions of self-determination, that is, military service.48 
 
By not fulfilling this most sacred civic duty of military service, the groups who do not 
serve are generally relegated to the Israeli social periphery. In this position, they find 
themselves at a distinct disadvantage in terms of equality of opportunity. 
 The most profound consequence of non-service is economic. By and large, Jewish 
Israelis who do not serve in the IDF are denied employment opportunities in both the 
public and private sectors.49 For the haredi yeshiva students who receive deferments from 
the IDF, options to generate income are limited. According to Matthew Wagner, a 
journalist for the Jerusalem Post, Jewish men are forbidden by law from seeking 
employment until they have served in the army, have reached the age of forty-one, or 
have fathered five children by the age of thirty-one.50 While Wagner also reports that 
many haredi yeshiva students work within the black market haredi community, this 
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income is barely enough to provide for one individual, let alone the large families that are 
characteristic of the haredi community.51  
 A few statistics will illustrate the dismal economic situation of Israel’s haredi 
community. Haredi households have an average of 7.7 children, and sixty percent of the 
heads of these households (the haredi male population, aged 25-54) does not work at all 
due to full-time yeshiva studies.52 In order to cope with this economic situation, the state 
pays for at least seventy percent of haredi families’ total income.53 Government stipends 
for yeshiva students account for half of this income (a meager $200 per month in 1997), 
and the remainder comes from state-subsidized child allowances.54 Even with these 
welfare benefits, the haredi economic situation is dire: over half of the haredi population 
falls below the poverty line.55 While their lowly economic status is not wholly a by-
product of non-service – for some haredim refuse to work in any environment associated 
with Zionism – it is difficult to dispute the argument that their refusal to participate in the 
IDF is directly correlated to haredi economic distress. 
  
Grievances against Haredi Yeshiva Student Exemptions 
 The effects of the marginalization of those who do not serve in the IDF are not 
simply economic. To be sure, the policy of haredi yeshiva student deferrals has generated 
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a major social conflict between the haredi communities and the rest of Jewish Israeli 
society, or as Steven V. Mazie has described, “a worsening Kulturkampf.”56 Part of this 
conflict arises out of the fact that military service places an immeasurable burden on IDF 
recruits. Drafted at the age of eighteen for an initial period of three years, soldiers are 
essentially deprived of three of the most formative years of their lives. While most 
eighteen-year-olds are leaving home for college or entering the job market for the first 
time, these Jewish Israelis embark on a path that will expose them to violence and death. 
Furthermore, after their initial service, IDF recruits devote several weeks per year to 
reserve duty until their mid-fifties. As such, “[reserve] soldiers experience enormous 
difficulties in their family lives, academic training, and especially their careers.”57  
 Due to this immense burden, IDF recruits and reservists have voiced two primary 
grievances against the policy of deferred military service for haredi yeshiva students. 
Their first objection is related to the economic situation of the haredim. Many IDF 
soldiers cannot fathom why haredi communities receive such an enormous amount of 
financial support from the state when they do not participate in the state’s most 
fundamental civic duty. According to Nurit Stadler and Eyal Ben-Ari, this grievance is 
rooted in the idea of citizenship and the equitable distribution of civic responsibilities. 
“The [h]aredi community is criticized for accumulating state resources without evincing 
a willingness to bear their share of collective duties. These stances have often been 
formulated in terms of the [h]aredim being ‘parasites’ of the state…”58 The degree of 
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IDF soldiers’ frustration at this trend is observable in one of the interviews conducted by 
Donna Rosenthal for her book, The Israelis: Ordinary People in an Extraordinary Land. 
One of her interviewees, Tamir, a teenage soldier on active duty, expressed his irritation 
in powerful terms:  
They’re draft evaders. It’s disgusting, unfair…We feel betrayed. Instead of 
‘One People, One Draft,’ we carry their load, protecting them and 
supporting them and their enormous families…If they don’t want to share 
the burden, they should leave the country.59  
 
From the perspective of the soldier, his/her service is an indispensable component of 
protecting the existence of an Israeli society where the haredim are free to practice their 
lifestyle. That the haredim are predominantly exempt from service leads soldiers to 
question the legitimacy of the state’s reasoning for continuing to provide physical and 
financial support for these communities. Thus, the IDF soldier might argue that only 
through military service may an Israeli be allowed to enjoy the full social and material 
benefits of the state.  
 The second grievance of IDF soldiers is related to the aforementioned maxim that 
defines the state as the front line of defense in times of war. Because violence permeates 
every facet of Israeli life, most Israelis believe that they serve not only to ensure the 
continued existence of the State of Israel but also to protect their families and loved ones 
from harm. In this respect, military service becomes a deeply personal issue. Jewish 
Israelis accept their military service because it directly contributes to the safety and 
wellbeing of the people to whom they are closest. Hence, Jewish Israeli soldiers take 
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exception to the haredi communities’ rejection of military service. To these soldiers, it 
may seem that the haredim exploit the willingness of the vast majority of Israeli Jews to 
serve by staying home, thereby avoiding the effects of violent conflict. From this 
perspective, the proverbial give-and-take of military service is deeply flawed; most 
Jewish Israelis sacrifice their lives to the state while most haredim unjustly enjoy the 
protective benefits of Israel’s robust military apparatus. 
 The voices of resentment toward the haredi avoidance of military service emanate 
from a wide range of sectors in Jewish Israeli society, from both right- and left-wing 
political parties and secular and non-haredi religious segments. For instance, Yosef 
Lapid, former Knesset Member of the Shinui Party, railed against this policy, exclaiming, 
“And what is this exemption of…yeshiva students from military service, but the trade in 
the blood of secular youngsters…a cynical, corrupt, and offensive trade in the lives of our 
children.”60 Moreover, Captain Gil Bickel, a deputy battalion commander in the IDF 
reserves, protested this policy by handing in his military rank and officer’s ID. He 
proclaimed, “I won’t serve in the reserves any longer and if I am called up, I would rather 
be locked up…so many [haredi] citizens shirk their service, without any justification and 
without any consideration from the military in terms of distributing the load equally.”61  
 Most interestingly, one particular haredi rabbi is known to have opposed this 
policy. Rabbi Shlomo Yosef “Rav” Zevin makes a compelling argument against haredi 
yeshiva student exemptions very much in line with his secular counterparts. He begins his 
                                                
60 Stadler, “Other-Worldly Soldiers,” 19. 
 
61 Hanan Greenberg, “We Won’t Be the Nation’s Suckers,” Ynetnews.com, 13 July 2007; available from 





statement by taking a jab at those haredi yeshiva students who do not serve. “Will you 
send your brothers to war, and yourselves sit at home...Is your blood redder than 
theirs?”62 Zevin then poses a hypothetical question, asking haredi yeshiva students what 
they would do if every person was a yeshiva scholar and there was no IDF to provide for 
defense. “Would we allow our enemies to ravage our land and kill our people without 
taking up arms to defend ourselves?”63 Zevin concludes his statement by summoning one 
of his halachic sources that commands everyone to contribute to defense during wartime. 
“All go out to fight, even the bridegroom from his chamber and the bride from her 
chuppah.”64 In essence, Zevin’s remarks aim to push haredi yeshiva students to look 
inward and examine the value that they place on their families and communities. Is there 
more intrinsic value on Torah studies than on physical safety? Must Torah scholars 
acquiesce in the face of violence and subject themselves to the actions of attacking 
armies? Although these are difficult questions to penetrate, the following chapters will 
attempt to reveal a detailed response by analyzing the various motivations for non-
service, from traditional religious commandments to moral precepts of non-violence. 
 
Conscientious Objectors 
 Related to the mass deferment of haredi yeshiva students from military service is 
the growing phenomenon among other less religious Jewish Israelis who either invoke 
their right to conscientious objection by refusing to obey military orders in certain 
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situations or resist the IDF draft altogether. This particular trend began to gain steam 
during the al-Aqsa Intifada as growing numbers of Jewish Israelis objected to the manner 
in which their government responded to the mounting unrest in the Occupied 
Territories.65  Emerging from this political indignation were four groups: Yesh Gvul, 
Courage to Refuse, New Profile, and Shministim. While these groups differ in their modi 
operandi, they are united by their opposition to Israel’s policy in the Occupied Territories 
as well as by their conviction that individual Jewish Israelis possess the right to refuse 
military service. Moreover, their existence is made possible by the creeping changes 
taking place in the relationship between military service and civilian life in Israel. 
Whereas in the past, military service in Israel was directly related to the social standing of 
the individual, its effect on some demographic groups’ ability to flourish in the business 
and political realm has since ebbed. Unlike the haredim, these protest groups belong to 
the middle and upper Ashkenazi classes of Israeli society. As such, their potential for 
upward mobility in Israeli society is less dependent on their military record than the poor 
and ethnic elements of Israeli society who rely on military service to enhance their status 
in the Israeli body politic.66  
 In addition to the waning relationship between military service and civilian life, 
repeated IDF debacles – i.e. the government’s failure to foresee the outbreak of the 1973 
Yom Kippur War and the IDF’s disastrous invasions and subsequent occupation of 
Lebanon – have led segments of Israeli society to challenge openly the pervasiveness of 
the IDF in civil society. These segments object to the prioritization of military values in 
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contemporary Israel and advocate a societal shift away from the current militaristic 
culture of the state. According to Yulia Zemlinskaya, their beliefs belong to a new 
philosophy known as Post-Zionism, which, “…criticiz(es) the discriminatory nature of 
the state defined in nationalistic terms…and provides a vision of a more civil and liberal 
Israel.”67 One of the most visible manifestations of the Post-Zionist critique is the public 
challenge to unconditional and uncontested service in the IDF.  
 As mentioned previously, these protest groups contest compulsory IDF service in 
different ways. For instance, members of Yesh Gvul (“There is a limit!”) and Courage to 
Refuse advocate the right of an IDF soldier to refuse to participate in military service on a 
case-by-case basis. Comprised primarily of reservist soldiers, members of Yesh Gvul and 
Courage to Refuse are not wholly opposed to military service. On the contrary, they 
believe that IDF service is an important civic duty for Jewish Israelis. However, their 
enthusiasm for military sacrifice is equaled by their intense objection to IDF operations in 
Palestinian towns and neighborhoods. When ordered to serve in the Occupied Territories, 
the soldiers belonging to these two groups argue that they possess the right for “selective 
refusal.”68 According to their logic, if a soldier opposes – intellectually, politically, 
emotionally or spiritually – a specific military plan, that soldier should be allowed the 
freedom to refuse to be a party to the operation. They advocate a system in which the 
IDF, “…allow[s] each individual the leeway to decide where, when and under what 
circumstances he will fulfill his military duties.”69 To be sure, this line of reasoning 
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neither rejects military service outright nor downplays the necessity of Israel’s powerful 
military establishment. If anything, their selective refusal reflects a concern that IDF 
operations in the Occupied Territories actually threaten the security of Israel proper by 
inflaming anti-Israeli sentiments. So while the members of Yesh Gvul and Courage to 
Refuse object to certain IDF strategies, they still remain deeply committed to the defense 
of the Jewish nation.  
 Unlike Yesh Gvul and Courage to Refuse, members of New Profile and 
Shministim (“twelfth graders”) reject IDF service outright. Composed of high-school age 
Jewish Israelis, these conscientious objectors oppose all forms of military service, from 
roles in combat and logistical support to educational and media functions. This younger 
generation of conscientious objectors is ardently pacifistic, wholly committed to 
preserving life at all costs. For these youths, human life is priceless, and its existence 
should not be threatened by any mandatory state requirements. Hence,  
…the value of the nation-state is nullified by the value of human life…The 
state [is] a tool that is meant to serve its citizens. No state can demand its 
citizens to sacrifice their life in its name. The existence of people…‘is 
more important than existence of a country.’ The Jewish state is not an 
exception.70  
 
Members of New Profile and Shministim refuse to place their lives in danger for the sake 
of the State of Israel, arguing that the government does not have the moral authority to 
make such demands. In addition to this conviction, these students castigate the very 
nature of Israel’s conscription policy, asserting that military service is a source of moral 
decay. With strikingly similar rhetoric as young haredi males who do not serve in the 
IDF, these largely secular youngsters view military service, “…as corrupting society’s 
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moral image, as harming its security and economy,” and they believe that, 
“…participating in the military means committing immoral acts.”71 In sum, for the 
members of New Profile and Shministim, military service is utterly negative, no matter 
the utility it provides in protecting the existence of the Jewish state. 
 The actions of all four groups described above have not been without controversy. 
Like the policy of haredi yeshiva student exemptions, the Israeli courts have weighed in 
on the matter of draft resistance and conscientious objection. In one well-known case, 
The Military Prosecutor v Private Haggai Matar et al. (2003), five individuals who 
refused to report for duty in the Occupied Territories were put on trial, charged with 
disobeying a direct military order. After hearing both sides of the argument, the court 
ruled against the defendants, summarizing its opinion in a particularly sharp verdict: 
This is [an] ideological or political crime, and it is more severe and 
dangerous than regular criminal activity stemming from a wish for 
personal benefit…not only do they disobey the law, they renounce its 
compulsory power. They might be imitated by others, enjoy the support of 
people and public institutions, which hinders an egalitarian enforcement of 
law, and might gather around them a large public, who might be prepared 
to exhibit violence [sic] behavior to the point of mutiny and rebellion 
against the authorized government, that is, democratic society.72 
 
From this statement, it is clear how the government feels about conscientious objectors 
and draft-dodgers: they simply cannot be tolerated. Jewish Israeli youth must willfully 
report for military service and unquestioningly obey orders. Any resistance to this policy, 
as the court surmised in its opinion, threatens the very stability the Jewish nation.  
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 But why are the haredim seemingly shielded from punishment for not reporting 
for military duty unlike the rest of their young peers? Are the tens of thousands of haredi 
youths exempted from military service not an example that might be imitated? Do haredi 
military exemptions represent an egalitarian enforcement of the law? These are difficult 
questions to answer, and any conclusions are certain to be controversial. Nevertheless, it 
is imperative to take note of the court’s aforementioned verdict when considering the 
societal strife engendered by the government’s long-standing policy of wholesale military 
exemptions for haredi yeshiva students. Indeed, the government’s apparent double-
dealing is not without consequences. 
 
Public Opinion and Conscription Policy 
 The data reveal that the majority of Israelis supports current IDF conscription 
procedures and opposes the right of a soldier to refuse orders to serve. According to 
Asher Arian, 89 percent of the Jewish population favored conscription service over a 
volunteer army in 2001.73 Moreover, Yehuda Ben Meir and Dafna Shaked report that in 
the years 2003-2007, an average of over 75 percent of Jewish Israelis considered the 
refusal of an IDF soldier to serve in the Occupied Territories as illegitimate, with their 
disapproval for refusing orders peaking at 83 percent in 2004 and dropping to 68 percent 
in 2005.74 Arian also reports that in 2003, a meager 27 percent of Jewish Israelis believed 
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that the responsibility of military service was spread out equally among the population, 
owing to a large extent to their disapproval of military exemptions bequeathed to certain 
social groups.75  
 A more detailed explanation of this disapproval is revealed in the data offered by 
Eliezer Ben-Rafael in his 2008 essay, “The Faces of Religiosity in Israel: Cleavages or 
Continuum.” He presents the findings of a survey question given to 971 Jewish Israeli 
respondents, in which they are invited to measure their attitude to the question, “Military 
service is crucial in Israel; should some groups be exempted – such as ultra-Orthodox 
youngsters, religious women, Arabs, or pacifists?”76 The respondents are asked to 
describe their attitude toward military exemptions as “opposed,” “don’t really know,” or 
“yes,” and their responses are broken down according to their self-identified religious 
orientation (see Table 1). Ben-Rafael’s findings are consistent with Arian’s findings, as in 
2008, 71 percent of all respondents opposed military exemptions. If the ultra-Orthodox 
respondents are excluded from the sample, the average rises to 74 percent. Of those 
favoring military exemptions, the national average is 14 percent, and it drops to 12 
percent when the ultra-Orthodox are excluded. The non-religious and traditional 
categories reflect these averages, as 77 percent of the non-religious and 74 percent of the 
traditional oppose military exemptions, and 9 percent of the non-religious and 13 percent 
of the traditional respondents support military exemptions. Most likely, the respondents  
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from the previous two categories who favor military exemptions believe that either 
conscientious objectors ought to be granted exemptions or Arab-Israeli citizens should 
not be allowed to serve in the IDF.  
 The opinions of the religious and ultra-Orthodox respondents are more puzzling, 
and the significant number of respondents that chose the vague “don’t really know” 
option leaves much to speculation. For the religious respondents, of whom many are 
members of the National Religious Party, only 56 percent oppose the policy of military 
exemptions. This figure is indeed perplexing, because it is the national-religious segment  
of Israel’s Jewish population that is most committed to retaining every square inch of 
Eretz Yisrael. It seems reasonable to conjecture that people in the national-religious camp 
would want every able-bodied Jewish Israeli fighting on the front lines. This figure may 
indicate, however, that a large portion of the national-religious camp is content to carry 
the bulk of the burden of military service.  
 Like the religious respondents, the opinions of the ultra-Orthodox toward military 
exemptions are peculiar. The relatively high number of respondents who oppose military 
exemptions (27 percent) and the surprisingly low number who support exemptions (50 
     Table 1: Attitudes toward Exemptions from the Military (n=971).
  Military service is crucial in Israel; should some groups be exempted -
such as ultra-Orthodox youngsters, religious women, Arabs, or pacifists? (%)
Opposed Don’t Really Know Yes
Ultra-Orthodox (n=48) 27 23 50
Religious (n=95) 56 24 20
Traditional (n=334) 74 13 13
Non-religious (n=494) 77 14 9
Source: Eliezer Ben-Rafael, "The Faces of Religiosity in Israel:
Cleavages or Continuum?," Israel Studies 13, no. 3 (Fall 2008): 113.
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percent) do not seem consistent with the theory that the haredi communities demonstrate 
a wholesale approval of military exemptions for their young men. For this theory to be 
accurate, one would expect to see a far lower percentage opposing military exemptions (a 
negligible number consisting primarily of outliers) and a far higher percentage supporting 
military exemptions (representative of far more than just half of the respondents). One 
explanation is that this survey is not representative of the entire ultra-Orthodox 
population, as only 5 percent of the respondents are ultra-Orthodox. A more accurate 
study would need to incorporate 2-4 percent more ultra-Orthodox respondents. In spite of 
this limitation, the numbers are still unexpected. Just as the percentage of ultra-Orthodox 
men that serve in the IDF is far below the 27 percent of respondents who oppose military 
exemptions, so is the percentage of haredi men who do not serve far above the 50 percent 
who support exemptions.77 Even if the groups mentioned in the question are isolated from 
one another – ultra-Orthodox youngsters, religious women, Arabs and pacifists – a 
suitable explanation for these ultra-Orthodox opinions is still elusive. The current 
numbers of exemptions for ultra-Orthodox youngsters proves that this exemption is 
highly popular in haredi circles. Furthermore, the highly conservative and patriarchal 
nature of the haredi communities makes it unlikely that haredi men would support 
military service for their women, and advocating military service for Arabs is even less 
likely, primarily due to the ethnocentric and xenophobic culture that pervades haredi 
society. That leaves the pacifists. If the pacifists mentioned in this survey are separated 
from any haredim who may have a pacifistic outlook and defined solely by their non-
haredi religious beliefs, an explanation may be forthcoming. Since the haredim believe 
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that the true ‘holders’ of the Torah should be exempted from military service, they may 
also believe that all other Jewish Israelis who do not fully dedicate their lives to this 
virtuous endeavor should, in fact, serve in the IDF. In this scenario, the haredim would 
have to believe that exemptions are a privilege reserved only for the righteous; for those 
who do not seek to impart God’s protection to the Jewish people spiritually, their fate lies 
on the battlefield. Even this conclusion, however, is tenuous. The ultra-Orthodox 
responses to this survey question are truly confounding. 
 With the rise of groups such as Yesh Gvul, Courage to Refuse, New Profile and 
Shministim, a new twist has been added to the already controversial IDF conscription 
policy. Members of these groups advocate the right of an individual Jewish Israeli to 
decide if and when he/she wants to serve in the military. Yet unlike their fellow citizens 
in the haredi communities, the members of these protest groups do not rely on a formal 
governmental mechanism to legitimize their decision not to serve. Instead, they are often 
subjected to criminal charges of disobedience and chastised as deleterious citizens of the 
Israeli body politic. Herein lies a problem: the government acquiesces to the exemption 
of haredi youngsters, justifying its actions by claiming that it must respect haredi 
religious convictions. But when secular Israeli youth assert that their political orientation 
conflicts with military service, they are punished. Despite this apparent government 
hypocrisy, the Jewish Israeli public favors a true ‘universal’ conscription policy. A look 
at the data above clearly shows that the majority of Jewish Israelis are opposed to both 
conscientious objection and haredi military exemptions. For the bulk of the Jewish Israeli 
public, who belong neither to the secular, pacifistic crowd on the left nor to the 
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conservative, haredi communities on the right, military service should be borne equitably 
by all Jewish Israelis. 
 
Conclusion 
 This chapter discussed the significance of military service in Israeli society and 
explained the benefits that the Israeli citizen derives from it. It also described how haredi 
non-service has resulted in the marginalization of the haredi communities both socially 
and economically. Moreover, it provided a brief summary of the negative responses of 
conscripted Jewish Israelis to the policy of haredi exemptions. It then explored a situation 
strikingly similar to haredi yeshiva student exemptions – the conscientious objector 
movement – and followed with an in-depth analysis of Jewish Israeli public opinion on a 
range of topics related to Israel’s conscription policy. In closing, the potential for an 
eruption of conflict as a result of this policy is possible. While there is not yet any 
evidence that this policy has produced a conflagration of violence between those who 
serve and those who do not, there is little reason to believe that Israeli society is immune 









Chapter Three  
–  
The Haredim Do Not Want to Serve
 
 
 The first hypothesis of this thesis asks if the majority of haredi yeshiva students 
do not serve in the IDF for the simple reason that they do not want to. In this scenario, it 
is not a religious objection or a moral imperative against violence and conflict that shapes 
their attitude to military service. On the contrary, haredi yeshiva students reject military 
service for reasons that are historical, social and communal. Thus, this chapter will begin 
by attempting to describe how the haredi communities perceive themselves in relation to 
the State of Israel. By analyzing their self-identification as Jews still in exile as well as 
their categorical rejection of Zionism, this chapter will show that the various sects of 
haredim operate as a distinct community not beholden to the predominant values and 
obligations that define the rest of Jewish Israeli society. It will then shed some light on 
the world of the yeshiva by describing the importance placed on the role of the Torah 
scholar and illustrating some of the fears that exist regarding the negative influence of 
contact with the IDF. This chapter will conclude by attempting to determine the extent to 
which these historical, social and communal factors induce young haredi males to 






The Haredi Belief System 
 The foundation of the haredi belief system begins with the destruction of the 
Second Jewish Temple in 70 C.E. Years after its destruction, the Jewish people were sent 
into exile, forcing them to set up communities across the globe. For centuries, the Jewish 
Diaspora resided in multiple nations and awaited their return to Eretz Yisrael (Hebrew for 
Land of Israel). Traditional Jewish history represents this period of exile as the great 
tragedy of the Jewish people. For the haredim, however, this exile of almost two 
millennia is presented as a direct message from God. It was a,  
…divine punishment of the people of Israel, a sign from heaven that 
nonobservant Jews [did] not deserve a state of their own. Only through 
full Jewish repentance and strict observance of God’s commandments 
[would] God forgive and redeem His people.78  
 
This redemption would be realized by the coming of the Messiah, who would reveal 
Himself and usher His people back into Eretz Yisrael. 
 Late into the nineteenth century, the Jewish Diaspora remained in exile, 
assimilated into various nations around the world. At this point, small communities of 
religious Jews were living in Palestine. For most of the world’s Jewry, however, Palestine 
was merely a destination for one’s death and burial. It was not until a little known Eastern 
European Jewish journalist named Theodor Herzl popularized the concept of political 
Zionism that world Jewry began to dream of finally returning to Eretz Yisrael. While 
Zionism quickly gained a massive following, haredi communities spurned it, considering 
it apostasy, as the Messiah had not yet revealed Himself. For the haredim, God,  
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…made it clear to His people that they were supposed to wait patiently 
until He decided they were deserving of redemption. He instructed them 
not to ‘rebel’ against the world’s nations and not to initiate massive Jewish 
settlement in Eretz Israel [sic].79  
 
As the Zionist ideology eventually gave way to the establishment of the State of Israel, 
the haredim did not alter their stance; the State of Israel was illegitimate and the two-
thousand year exile of the Jewish people continued, uninterrupted.80 
 Indeed, large numbers of haredim immigrated to Israel at its independence, but 
this was primarily due to the fact that many were escaping the horrors of the Holocaust 
and had few options for sanctuary outside of Israel. What they found in Israel was a 
society that had rejected the traditional and religious tenets of Judaism in favor of liberal 
and secular values. Reacting to this discovery, the various haredim communities began to 
view themselves as the true keepers of Judaism, since the rest of Israeli society had, in 
their eyes, abandoned God and His blessings. As ‘real Jews,’ the haredi communities 
increasingly started to, “…perceive life in Israel as exile among Jews,” connected to each 
other by, “…a sense of collective trauma resulting from the choice of the majority of 
Jewish society to leave the folds of traditional life in favor of other…options.”81 Owing 
to their religious worldview, most haredim in Israel do not recognize the State of Israel or 
its government. Their only concern is to ensure that historical Jewish traditions are not 
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rendered obsolete – as nearly happened during the Holocaust – by modern Israeli 
society.82 
 Because haredi communities reject the State of Israel, they believe that they are 
de facto free of all civic duties, including military service. They claim that their 
communities existed in Eretz Yisrael long before Zionism emerged, so they are free to 
operate by their own standards and ignore the obligations incumbent on other Israeli 
citizens.  
By summoning the history of the ultra-Orthodox rejection of 
Zionism…one essential element is missing from the social contract 
reasoning according to which Israelis all owe equal duties to state: the 
element of consent. The Haredim [sic]…not only withheld express consent 
to the Zionist project but offered unequivocal rejection of [it].83  
 
From the haredi point-of view, they might be Israeli citizens, but they are in no way 
compelled to participate in the state’s institutions. Because they opposed the State of 
Israel from the very beginning, the haredim do not feel as if they are indebted to the state. 
Military service is for those Jewish Israelis who associate with the state; the haredi 
communities disassociate themselves from the state and are therefore not responsible for 
its defense. 
  
Military Service and the Torah Scholar 
 One reason that the haredim avoid military service is because the IDF is 
ideologically rooted in Zionism. Throughout its history, the IDF has ingrained in every 
soldier an existential connection to the state. This is unacceptable for haredim, as Jews 
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should have only one spiritual and temporal connection, their link to God. Yohai Hakak 
observes that the haredim believe that the IDF,  
…aims to exchange the attachment to G-d [sic] and religion with an 
attachment to a nation, rendering G-d [sic] and spiritual aspects 
redundant…other earthly issues – such as the quality, sophistication and 
readiness of the weaponry of the soldiers – are more relevant. Man and not 
G-d [sic] plays the central role.84  
 
Anything that comes between the yeshiva student and God is considered a sin, and the 
student’s devotion to God is uncompromising. Affinity for any worldly pleasure or object 
is strictly forbidden. Consequently, IDF service, in which the development of a love for 
Israel is a key component, is utterly dangerous and threatens to undermine the yeshiva 
student’s steadfast commitment to God. 
 A poster observed by author Nurit Stadler in the ultra-Orthodox Jerusalem 
neighborhood of Meah Shearim demonstrates this attitude to military service. It reads, 
“Suicidal! Be all that you can be in the Nahal.”85 Ironically, the poster’s mention of 
suicide does not allude to physical death. More accurately, it refers to spiritual death, the 
result of abandoning yeshiva studies to serve in the military. Although the young haredi 
male can return to the yeshiva after he serves, his decision to interrupt his Torah study is 
a transgression of the highest order. Study of religious texts is a lifelong undertaking. 
Deviation for any purpose, at any time during the student’s life, is problematic for the 
scholar. Military service, in particular, corrupts the yeshiva student by removing him 
from his community and placing him in “…a highly dangerous and contaminated sphere 
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of action.”86 This experience can prove to be disastrous for the Torah scholar, as it 
directly affects his ability to interpret God’s word. Hence,  
…he is not suitable or fit for service in the army because of the physical 
and mental practices required of him as a studious man. A yeshivah [sic] 
student is supposed to a possess a gentle and wise soul, and only this 
sensitivity allows him to study with utter devotion.87  
 
If a yeshiva student chooses to enlist, his ability to scrutinize the scriptures will be 
forever altered. He cannot expect to return to his studies after military service with the 
same vigor that he once possessed. His value as a Torah scholar, then, is drastically 
reduced. 
 The fear that one’s ability to study the Torah will be affected by military service 
did not evolve in a vacuum. To be sure, haredi leaders have worked tirelessly to instill 
this line of thinking into the young and impressionable men in their communities. Stadler, 
Lomsky-Feder and Ben-Ari argue that, “attitudes to military service highlight the 
persistent attempt to preserve religious separateness from secular state activities in order 
to maintain the exclusive cultural values and life-styles of the ultra-Orthodox.”88 Their 
reasons are two-fold, one official and one unspoken. Haredi leaders’ official justification 
for dissuading young men from enlisting in the IDF is to protect them from the 
secularizing effects of military service. One danger that they point to is the mingling of 
sexes in the IDF. Haredi men are instructed to avoid succumbing to physical and mental 
temptations with women. As such, young haredi men are usually kept away from 
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interacting with women until they marry. In the IDF, where men and women serve in the 
same units, complete gender segregation is difficult to guarantee. Although the Nahal 
battalion is segregated from female soldiers, the chances that haredi men will encounter 
women in the army are still high. The temptation to interact with females in the army is 
far too risky for haredi leaders to allow their young men to enlist.89  
 In addition to the danger of mixing with the female gender, haredi leaders believe 
that the IDF will, “…expose Haredi [sic] to a corrupted youth culture,” which will lead to 
the questioning of their traditions.90 As has already been discussed, the IDF brings 
together myriad cultures and values. Since most IDF recruits are still in their late teens, 
they are very impressionable and susceptible to new ideas and beliefs. Yeshiva students 
are no exception.  
Mixing with all types of Israelis, including secular Jews, traditional Jews 
and those who call themselves ‘religious’ Zionists, the young Haredi [sic] 
will hear perspectives on the world and Judaism he has never heard before 
and meet temptations he hasn’t dreamt of.91  
 
New ideas can have a devastating effect on the young haredi man, as they might lead the 
yeshiva student to doubt the existence of God or question His commandments. This 
would undoubtedly constitute an unforgivable sin. In order to protect yeshiva students 
from committing this sin, the haredi authorities believe that yeshiva students ought to 
avoid this venue of temptation altogether. 
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Political Consequences of Haredi Enlistment 
 What was previously discussed is the officially espoused haredi viewpoint. Yet, 
one other factor of IDF service quietly concerns haredi authorities. This concern involves 
numbers and power. Haredi leaders depend on strong and united haredi communities. 
Bigger communities lead to larger voting blocs, which in turn lead to stronger legislative 
powers in the Knesset. Haredi politicians need high levels of electoral support in order to 
more forcefully promote legislation that both provides increasing welfare benefits to 
haredi communities and pushes for more stringent religious regulations on public life in 
Israel. As such, haredi leaders cannot afford to lose members of their communities to 
other ways of life. It is precisely for this reason that haredi leaders discourage young 
haredim from enlisting in the military. They are afraid that the yeshiva student will be 
attracted to other worldviews offered to him in the army and leave the folds of the ultra-
Orthodox community.92 Should too many young haredi men choose this path, the 
thinking goes, the very survival of the haredi communities in Israel would be 
jeopardized.93 
  
Social Repercussions of Military Service 
 For yeshiva students themselves, fear of enlistment goes beyond the concern that 
it will affect their studies or damage their standing in the eyes of God. Indeed, enlistment 
can engender severe social consequences for the yeshiva student. Because the IDF is 
associated with Zionism, young haredi men cannot join without creating the impression 
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that they sympathize with the ideology of mainstream Israeli society. There is the fear 
among yeshiva students that any association with the Zionist enterprise automatically 
leads to difficulty in rising through the ranks of haredi society. Military service can affect 
one’s ability to find employment in the community, and worse, hinder one’s ability to 
marry and have children. Stadler and Ben-Ari quote a yeshiva student who voices this 
anxiety: 
You have to understand that from a young age they get it into our heads 
that the army in an abomination, obscenity, that boys and girls are together 
all of the time…The eighteen-year-old members of the [haredim] are 
concerned to find a good match for marriage. Your stock goes up in direct 
proportion to the study of the Torah and any involvement in the army on 
the part of your family turns you immediately into a second class citizen.94 
 
From this comment, it appears that haredi leaders have provoked a fear of military 
service by attaching a deleterious stigma to it. Having done so, haredi leaders utilize this 
fear as a mechanism for social control. Their power over the thought processes of the 
young haredi male population allows haredi authorities to preserve the ‘sanctity’ of their 
communities and present a united front against the secular currents of mainstream Israeli 
society. Deviation from community norms is anathema, and haredi leaders make sure that 
their members are well aware of the consequences of independent thought and action. 
  
Conclusion 
 From the information offered in this chapter, one can conclude that haredi 
yeshiva students evade military service for the simple reason that they do not want to 
serve. Because their historical traditions conflict with the very foundations of 
                                                




contemporary Israeli society, the haredim have placed themselves outside of the 
parameters of citizenship. They reject the State of Israel and thus refuse to acquiesce to 
the obligations incumbent of normal Israeli citizens. In addition, haredi yeshiva students 
believe that their studies will suffer if they choose to interrupt them by enlisting in the 
military. Since Torah study takes precedence over everything, the yeshiva student cannot 
expect to unravel the mysteries of God’s word if he devotes any portion of his time to 
other considerations. Moreover, the haredi yeshiva student must remain pure. IDF service 
will expose the haredi youth to a world of transgression, and such an encounter can lead 
to a life-style that is devoid of God’s divine blessings. Finally, haredi communities 
condemn the man that enlists in the IDF. Owing to a need to preserve communal 
homogeneity, haredi leaders indoctrinate their young men by warning them of the social 
repercussions of military service. As such, the haredi man who serves in the IDF can 
expect to return to his community as a corrupted member, and he will find it difficult, if 
not impossible, to be perceived as a member fully committed to the haredi way of life. In 
sum, while it can be concluded that haredi yeshiva students do not want to serve in the 
IDF, it might be more appropriate to conclude that they cannot serve. The social 











Chapter Four  
–  
The Haredim Are Pacifists
 
 
 The second hypothesis of this thesis posits that haredi yeshiva students do not 
serve in the IDF because they are pacifists. They refuse to participate in an institution that 
actively engages in war and violent conflict, and their rejection of military service is a 
political act of pacifism. On the surface, this hypothesis seems straightforward. A cursory 
glance of the haredi communities’ political positions toward Israel’s involvement in 
violent conflicts should prove or disprove this hypothesis. This is not the case. Indeed, 
Israel’s haredim demonstrate a complex attitude to violence. Rhetorically, haredi 
traditions teach pacifism and restraint. There exists a consensual understanding that 
places a negative stigma on actions that result in the physical harm of a human being. In 
their actions, however, the haredim exhibit a strong propensity to violence, evidenced by 
a litany of aggressive incidents throughout their history in Israel. In an attempt to explain 
this apparent inconsistency between word and deed, this chapter will begin by examining 
the traditional haredi taboos associated with war and violence. It will then scrutinize 
haredi political views in the context of Israel’s experience with war and peace. 
Furthermore, this chapter will supply the reader with several examples of haredi 
violence, aimed at both internal and external targets, and will conclude by analyzing how 
future generations of haredim may regard the use of violence. After all of this has been 
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presented, it will become clear that Israel’s haredim possess a nuanced and incongruous 
notion of war and violent conflict. 
  
Foundations of Haredi Pacifism  
 As discussed in chapter three, Israel’s haredi communities evince a passionate 
rejection of Zionism, the founding ideology of the State of Israel. They believe that the 
founders of the state committed a grave sin by initiating a nation-building project 
independent of both God’s blessings and the revelation of the Messiah. Because of this 
idolatrous hubris, the majority of the haredim did not participate in any fighting during 
Israel’s War of Independence. In 1947, Amram Blau, leader of the haredi Neturei Karta 
sect, told his brethren that the true Jewish believer avoids violence and conflict. 
Therefore, he claimed, they must stay away from the fighting. He summoned the history 
of the Jewish people to cement his point: 
And after the destruction of the Temple and the exile of the People of 
Israel from its land, and after the Lord, Blessed be He, charged Israel not 
to rebel against the nations, there was no longer any possibility that Israel 
would have to resort to the sword, to cruelty and to bloodshed, God forbid. 
And it is two thousand years since Israel has returned its sword to the 
scabbard and has passed all the years of its exile in a different manner, one 
of submission and peace. Pliantly, it has faced all troubles and difficulties, 
and has greatly distanced itself from any sense of cruelty, not to mention 
murder and bloodshed. It has displayed a good and gentle spirit in its 
relations with the nations in whose lands it lives in exile. This pureness 
and innocence has been the glory of Israel in the eyes of the nations. And 
now there are some, who take the name of Israel, that have begun to resort 
to bloody hands, to turn the name of Israel known for its measure of 
compassion into one associated with murder and bloodshed, God forbid, to 
garb the People of Israel in clothing stained with blood. Even from the 
blood of their brethren they do not abstain, God forbid (Ha’Homa [The 
Wall], Neturei Karta journal, Kislev, December 1947).95 
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In addition to Blau’s message to the Jewish people in Palestine, Agudat Israel, the haredi 
political party in Mandate Palestine, condemned the violent tactics of the Jewish 
insurgent groups such as the Irgun and Lehi. It declared, “terrorism is an alien branch in 
the vineyard of loyal Judaism, a rotten fruit of secular political parties which educate for 
the admiration of power of the fist and the hands of Esau.”96 From these statements, it is 
clear war and violence were anathema to the haredim of the Mandate Period. As God’s 
chosen people, they argued, Jews are morally and ethically above the resort to violence. 
For the haredi yeshiva students of today’s Israel, this is certainly a legitimate justification 
for avoiding military service. They might assert that the true Jew is a pacifist, an anointed 
man who opposes war and violence in all forms, at all times. Gentiles wage war, they 
might say, not Jews. 
  
Haredi Political Views  
 Given this information, it comes as somewhat of a surprise that many non-haredi 
Israelis believe that the haredim possess intense right-wing, hawkish political views. 
Nurit Stadler claims these political attitudes are manifested by, “…Haredi [sic] support 
for intensive military activity in the occupied territories, and…[the] general Haredi [sic] 
approval of the army’s actions during the recent Intifadas.”97 Regarding the issue of 
military exemptions, Chaim I. Waxman adds that these political views cause much 
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friction with the majority of Israelis over the policy of military exemptions for haredi 
yeshiva students. According to Waxman, “…there [is] resentment…over their Right-
wing [sic] politics because their votes may move the country to a war in which they 
[yeshiva students] will not fight.”98 Is there truth to these allegations? Do the haredim 
demonstrate a right-wing bias? The data certainly point to this conclusion. 
 Using data collected by the Peace Index project team of the Tami Steinmetz 
Center for Peace Research at Tel Aviv University, Tamar Hermann and Ephraim 
Yuchtman-Yarr analyzed eighty-three surveys conducted between June 1994 and January 
2001, each survey including approximately five hundred randomly selected Jewish 
Israelis aged eighteen and over. With the results of these surveys, the authors placed each 
respondent into “Right,” “Floating,” and “Left” categories based on their aggregate 
voting behavior. Of the respondents who identified themselves as haredi, the authors 
classified the voting behavior of 79.3 percent as “Right,” 18.3 percent as “Floating” 
(middle) and 2.4 percent as “Left.”99 Whereas this data suggest that the haredi 
communities exhibit right-wing voting behavior, other data indicate that, along with the 
majority of the Jewish Israeli population, the haredi demographic belongs to the 
moderate/center category of the political spectrum. As part of their larger study, “The 
People Speak: Israeli Public Opinion on National Security 2005-2007,” Yehuda Ben Meir 
and Dafna Shaked submitted a questionnaire in 2006 to 724 Jewish Israeli respondents. 
The questionnaire consisted of fifteen questions relating to Israel’s national security, and 
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the aggregate results of each questionnaire were plotted along an axis that included the 
categories, “extreme left,” “moderate left,” “center,” “moderate right,” and “extreme 
right.” Based on their responses, 2 percent (1 respondent) of the 63 self-identified haredi 
respondents landed in the extreme left category; 6 percent (4 respondents) landed in the 
moderate left category; 56 percent (35 respondents) landed in the center category; 6 
percent (4 respondents) landed in the moderate right category; and 30 percent (19 
respondents) landed in the extreme right category.100 From these statistics, it is apparent 
that while the haredim may vote for right-wing political parties, their political opinions 
do not necessarily reflect a hard-line conservative outlook. At the same time, however, 
exceptional events such as the al-Aqsa Intifada and the 2006 Lebanon War have a 
centrifugal effect on haredi political opinions in much the same way that they do on the 
Jewish Israeli population as a whole. What still needs to be determined is how similar are 
the shifts in these opinions, and do the haredim tend to move further to the right during 
times of conflict than do the rest of the Jewish Israeli population? 
 Before answering these questions, it is important to understand what factors 
advise the political perspectives of Israel’s haredi communities. In particular, why does 
the voting behavior of the haredim tend to favor right-wing political candidates? The 
reasons are both cultural and historical. Culturally, Israel’s haredi communities are 
isolated and exclusive. Membership in the haredi communities requires individuals to 
withdraw from mainstream, secular Israeli society and embrace a bunker mentality, as 
interaction with the non-haredi world threatens the religious purity of their lifestyle. 
                                                




Resulting from this practice is an acute sense of ethnocentricity. Jonathan Rynhold 
provides an instructive perspective of this phenomenon: 
…Religion generates a sense of an in-group and an out-group that serves 
to encourage an ethnocentric orientation…This religious basis for group 
differentiation gives ethnocentricity a reified quality that heightens its 
resonance…This is especially relevant to the Jewish religious tradition, 
which places God’s covenantal relationship with the Jewish people (rather 
than with the individual) at its center.101 
 
Certainly, Jewish Israelis define their Jewishness in multiple ways. For secular Jews in 
Israel who observe little to no religious traditions, Jewishness is an ethnic concept, rooted 
in an ancient and common history. As their identity is defined by being Israeli as much as 
it is as being Jewish, most secular Jewish Israelis show few palpable signs of 
ethnocentricity. On the other end of the spectrum, Israel’s haredi communities observe 
all Jewish religious traditions, and they rarely, if ever, define themselves as Israeli. 
Because they believe that only through complete adherence to Jewish religious 
commandments and absolute faith in God can the Messiah reveal Himself, the haredim 
reject all alternative lifestyles and codes of morality. Consequently, the haredim exhibit a 
strong ethnocentric antipathy not only toward non-haredi Jewish Israelis but also toward 
non-Jewish Israelis and Israel’s Arab neighbors. The political upshot of this 
ethnocentricity is revealed through hawkish political attitudes, and thus, political 
movements based on the liberal tenets of freedom, justice and equality do not infiltrate 
the haredi communities.102 Accordingly, when a political candidate espouses 
conservative views, he/she will more likely than not secure the vote of the haredim. 
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 Haredi partiality towards right-wing politicians is also rooted in a series of 
historical events beginning with the 1967 War. After the IDF subdued its enemies in the 
lightning-quick Six-Day War, Israel found itself in possession of East Jerusalem and the 
biblical territories of Judea and Samaria. For nearly two decades before the war, these 
plots of land had merely been the object of intense dreams and desires. Now, in 1967, 
Jewish Israelis could travel freely to these destinations and landmarks that played such a 
significant role in ancient Jewish history. Following this development, popular political 
rhetoric in Israel began incorporating religious – even messianic – symbols, as the 
surprise victory and reclamation of ancient Jewish lands were framed in terms that 
credited God with this unimaginable triumph. Although the haredim did not – and still do 
not – assign significance to the landmass that is Israel and the disputed territories, they 
nevertheless warmed to the segments of mainstream Israeli society that shifted away from 
rigidly secular political oratory toward a religio-political platform. Unsurprisingly, these 
segments belonged primarily to the political Right.103  
 Haredi participation in politics may have waned in subsequent years as the 
moderate-left Labor Party maintained uninterrupted control of Israel for the next decade. 
However, with the paradigm-shifting victory of the right-wing Likud Party in 1977, the 
haredim found political leadership more in tune with the interests of their ultra-Orthodox 
lifestyle. Menachem Begin, the leader of the Likud Party, both emphasized the 
uniqueness of the Jewish people and identified with the elements of the public who 
observed Jewish religious tradition. As such, the haredim began to feel as if they had 
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more in common with the new right-wing government in Israel than with previous left-
leaning incarnations.104 
 Since Begin’s government in the late 1970s / early 1980s, the haredim have 
expanded their role in politics. Interestingly, their political support alters between right- 
and left-wing governments. Despite the perception that they perpetually gravitate toward 
right-wing candidates, in reality, the haredim back candidates that promise to advance 
their sectarian interests. For example, the haredim look for candidates who promise to 
subsidize their way of life by providing massive chunks of welfare for unemployed 
haredi men and their large families, funding for religious schools and synagogues, and 
segregated government housing blocs. Moreover, haredi voters favor candidates who 
pledge to place religious restrictions on Israeli public life. These voters seek,  
…to implement Talmudic law by enacting national legislation such as 
prohibiting work or public transportation on Shabbat, as well as the sale of 
non-kosher food [because] their religious convictions command them to 
involve themselves in all Jewish matters, including the lives of secular 
Jews.105 
 
Aside from these interests, the haredi vote is normally based on little else. Unlike the 
national-religious camp, the haredim are not concerned with retaining every square inch 
of Eretz Yisrael, and they therefore do not recognize the utility of involving themselves in 
matters relating to the wider Israeli-Palestinian conflict – unless, of course, it is to prod 
the Israeli government into protecting haredi settlements in the disputed territories, in 
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which case, any politician, right or left, who promises to safeguard these communities 
usually wins the support of the haredim.106 
 The previous paragraphs have detailed the bases of haredi political opinion and 
voting behavior. Yet while this information is true, it is also presented in a vacuum; more 
specifically, the aforementioned argument is best confirmed during times of relative 
peace and stability. For, in times of violent conflict, haredi political opinion takes on 
much different form, and more than any other demographic in Israel, violent conflict 
pushes the haredim furthest to the Right. Data provided by Asher Arian’s “Israeli Public 
Opinion on National Security 2003” illuminates this thesis. In his study, Arian tracks the 
responses of Jewish Israelis to the same question from three separate years – 1994, 1999, 
and 2003. The question asks if official treaties signify the end of conflict, and Arian 
records the number of respondents who “strongly agree” and “agree.” He then separates 
the respondents into four categories based on the extent of their religious observance: 
“none” or secular, “some” or traditional, “most” or Orthodox, and “all” or ultra-
Orthodox. The significance of the years Arian chooses to compare lies in each year’s 
association with peace and conflict. For instance, 1994 followed a year in which both the 
First Intifada came to a close and the Oslo Accords were signed. In 1999, the general 
mood was hopeful as the Israeli-Palestinian conflict seemed to be nearing a resolution 
after several successive treaties and agreements were signed over the past six years. 
Finally, 2003 was two years after the al-Aqsa Intifada erupted, and few could envision an 
end to the horrific daily displays of violence and bloodshed. Of the three years, 1994 
appears to be the control year across the board, as the responses of all four categories in 
                                                




this year are almost the exact mean of the responses from 1999 and 2003. A look at Table 
2 shows that all categories in 1999 responded more positively to the question than they 
did in 1994, and all categories in 2003 responded more negatively than in 1994. The 
ultra-Orthodox respondents dropped from an astonishing 40 percent agreement with the 
question in 1999 to a dismal 13 percent in 2003, a total decline of 27 percent. Orthodox 
responses fell 21percent over this period, from 51 percent agreement in 1999 to 30 
percent agreement in 2003. The traditional and secular respondents expressed an even 
greater change of opinion from 1999 to 2003, even though their disagreement with the 
question was nowhere near the negative attitudes of the ultra-Orthodox respondents.  
 
Traditionalists and Secularists decreased 34 percent and 33 percent respectively, with the 
former falling from 72 percent agreement in 1999 to 38 percent in 2003 and the latter 
shrinking from 77 percent agreement in 1999 to 44 percent in 2003.107 From these 
figures, it is clear that violent conflict pushes all Jewish Israelis to the Right. While 
violent conflict creates a greater degree of opinion shift among Traditionalists and 
Secularists than the Orthodox and ultra-Orthodox, it nevertheless pushes the haredim 
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         Table 2: Religious Breakdown of those Affirming that Treaties Signify 
                                        End of Conflict, 1994, 1999, and 2003.
                              (Percentage of those who strongly agree and agree)
Religious Observance -> None Some Most All
1994 59 50 34 26
1999 77 72 51 40
2003 44 38 30 13
Source: Asher Arian, "Israeli Public Opinion on National Security 2003," Jaffee
Center for Strategic Studies, Memorandum no. 67 (October 2003): pp. 26.
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furthest to the Right. These figures also reveal that even during times of relative peace, 
the haredim are equally or more pessimistic about the prospects for peace than are the 
Secularists and Traditionalists during times of intense conflict. It seems, then, that the 
haredim are, at all times, more right-wing than the rest of the Jewish Israeli population. 
 Arian’s work in “Israeli Public Opinion on National Security 2001” advances the 
argument that the haredim adopt stronger right-wing views during times of violent 
conflict than the rest of Jewish Israeli society. Drawn from surveys conducted between 
April 12, 2001 and May 11, 2001, Arian reports the opinions of 1,216 Jewish Israeli 
respondents during the seventh month of the bloody and traumatic al-Aqsa Intifada. One 
of his surveys asks respondents to gauge their support or opposition to the peace projects 
of then-Prime Minister Ehud Barak (i.e. 1999 peaces talks with Syria, 2000 Camp David 
Accords with Palestinians). The response choices are “strongly oppose,” “oppose,” 
“support,” and “strongly support,” and like the previous table, the respondents are 
identified by the extent of their religious observance. A full 90 percent (see Table 3) of  
the respondents categorized as observing all religious tradition strongly opposed or  
opposed Barak’s proposals. Compared to those who observe most religious tradition (79 
percent), some religious tradition (54 percent), and no religious tradition (42 percent), the 
ultra-Orthodox were by far the most anti-peace religious demographic. Furthermore, a 
mere 10 percent of the ultra-Orthodox supported or strongly supported Barak’s peace 
plans, compared with 21 percent of those who observe most, 36 percent of those who 
observe some, and 58 percent who observe no religious tradition. Most intriguing from 
these statistics is that 4 times more ultra-Orthodox respondents (52 percent) strongly 
opposed these peace plans than did secular respondents who strongly supported them (13 
 
63 
percent).108 While this may be an indication that the general Jewish Israeli mood was not 
optimistic about the possibility of peace at the time, it nevertheless shows that the 
haredim were far more anti-peace than the secular were pro-peace. This is most certainly 
a reflection of how severely the current violent conflict had affected every Jewish 
Israeli’s political views. 
  
 An additional survey by Arian in 2001 paints a more disturbing picture. He 
presents the statement, “There is no military solution to the conflict,” to the respondents 
and asks them to place themselves in the categories of “disagree,” “middle,” and “agree.” 
Again, he breaks down the respondents according to the extent of their religious 
observance. Interestingly, all four religious groups hovered around 12-13 percent in the 
ambivalent “middle” category (see Table 4). Of the respondents who observed all 
religious tradition, more than a quarter agreed with the statement, as did 51 percent of the 
respondents who observed no religious tradition. However, 59 percent of the ultra- 
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       Table 3: Support or Opposition to the Barak Proposals Broken Down by
                                                   Religious Observance (%)
Strongly Strongly
Religious Observance Oppose Oppose Support Support
Observe all        52 38 8 2
Observe most      34 45 20 1
Observe some 25 39 32 4
Observe none     15 27 45 13
Source: Asher Arian, "Israeli Public Opinion on National Security 2001," Jaffee




Orthodox respondents disagreed with the statement, believing that there was a military 
solution to the conflict. At the same time, more than one-third of the secular respondents 
and almost half of the traditional respondents found a military solution to be a viable 
option.109 When compared to Table 3, the opinions of the secular and traditional  
respondents are stable. The 51 percent of the Secularists who did not believe there was a 
military solution to the conflict are in line with the 58 percent of Secularists who 
supported and strongly supported Barak’s peace proposals. Similarly, the 38 percent of 
Traditionalists who agreed that the conflict could not be solved through military means 
mirrors the 36 percent of Traditionalists who supported and strongly supported Barak’s 
peace plans. This correlation, however, does not apply to the ultra-Orthodox respondents.  
Whereas only 10 percent of the ultra-Orthodox supported or strongly supported Barak’s 
peace policy, almost three times as many ultra-Orthodox respondents (29 percent) agreed 
that the Israeli-Palestinian conflict could not be solved with military action. To be sure, 
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           Table 4: Military Solution to the Conflict Broken Down
                                 by Religious Observance (%)
          Question: "There is no military solution to the conflict."
Religious Observance Disagree Middle Agree
Observe all 59 12 29
Observe most         54 13 33
Observe some 49 13 38
Observe none        37 12 51
Source: Asher Arian, "Israeli Public Opinion on National Security
2001," Jaffee Center for Strategic Studies, Memorandum no. 60
(August 2001): pp. 37.
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these figures demonstrate that the vast majority of ultra-Orthodox haredim do not 
consider a peaceful resolution to the conflict to be feasible, placing them squarely in the 
right-wing camp. But questions linger as to the logic of the haredi respondents who 
agreed that the military could not bring the conflict to a close. If there was no military 
solution to the conflict, and Barak’s strategy for settling the conflict peacefully was 
unacceptable, how then did this 29 percent imagine that peace could be attained? Perhaps 
they believed that God would divinely usher in an era of peace, or perhaps they did not 
want peace at all. 
 A 2004/2005 study substantiates the findings from Table 4, indicating that the 
haredim are more likely than the rest of Jewish Israeli society to condone a 
disproportionate use of military force to counter acts of terrorism. Table 5 displays data 
that was gathered by the National Security Studies Center at the University of Haifa. 
Over a period of four years – October 2000 through April 2004 – Daphna Canetti-Nisim, 
Eran Zaidise and Ami Pedahzur conducted eight identical telephone surveys with  
approximately 1,640 Jewish Israelis, in which they asked the respondents to indicate their 
support for various militant statements. For the purpose of this study, one particular  
statement stands out: “All means are justified in Israel’s war against terror.”110 The data  
show that in seven out of eight surveys, the haredim favored unleashing the IDF on 
terrorists by an average margin that is almost 5 percent higher than the rest of Israel’s 
Jews. Realistically, this disparity does not reveal much of a difference between the 
haredim and the other Jewish respondents, as the vast majority of Jewish Israelis  
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displayed extremely high levels of acceptance for heavy-handed military tactics during 
the al-Aqsa Intifada. Nevertheless, these data are consistent with the bulk of the data 
already discussed in this chapter: the haredim are more right-wing than the rest of Jewish 
Israeli society, even if they are so by a mere 5 percent. 
 One final table shows just how large a gap exists between the political opinions of 
the haredim and Israel’s less- or non-religious Jewish populations. The following figures 
come from the same 2006 survey conducted by Yehuda Ben Meir and Dafna Shaked. 
These researchers asked respondents to react to four central issues of the Israeli-
Palestinian conflict and then cataloged their responses into four main religious groups. 
The results substantiate the claim in this thesis that the ultra-Orthodox are considerably 
more right-wing in their political outlook than most of the Jewish Israeli population. 
Asked if they believed that there was a possibility of reaching a peace agreement with the 
Palestinians, 11 percent of the ultra-Orthodox concurred, compared with 21 percent 
religious, around 33 percent of the traditionalists and 44 percent of the secular 
respondents (see Table 6). As to whether the respondents would support a peace  
    Table 5: Percentage of Support for Militant Statements: Israeli
             Jews (total) and Haredim, October 2000 - April 2004
           "All means are justified in Israel's war against terror."
Date: Oct. Apr. Oct. Apr. Oct. Apr. Oct. Apr.
2000 2001 2001 2002 2002 2003 2003 2004
Jews (total) 79.3 77.2 81.2 80.2 78.1 76.6 74.4 77.1
Haredim 79 81.5 86.4 87.4 81.4 78 79.9 84.8
Source: Daphna Canetti-Nisim, Eran Zaidise and Ami Pedahzur, 
"Militant Attidutes among Israelis througout the al-Aqsa Intifada," 





agreement that involved major territorial concessions or at least minor concessions as part 
of a disengagement strategy, 84 percent of the ultra-Orthodox opposed this approach, as  
did 79 percent religious, 46 percent traditional and 37 percent secular. Ten percent of the 
ultra-Orthodox supported former Prime Minister Ariel Sharon’s Gaza disengagement  
plan, with 15 percent of the religious respondents supporting, about half of the 
traditionalists supporting, and 67 percent of the secular respondents favoring the policy. 
Finally, when faced with the question of whether they would agree to the establishment 
of a Palestinian state, 21 percent of the ultra-Orthodox respondents replied in the 
affirmative, in contrast to 36 percent religious, 67 percent traditional, and 76 percent 
            Table 6: Major Issues of Israeli-Palestinian Conflict Broken Down by
                                                     Religious Affiliation (%)
Issue Ultra-
Orthodox Religious Traditional Secular
Possibility of Reaching
Peace Agreement with 11 21 ~33 44
Palestinians
Agreement Involving
neither Major Territorial 84 79 46 37
Concessions nor Disen-
gagement with Minor Ones
Support for Gaza 10 15 ~50 67
Disengagement
Agreement to 21 36 67 76
Palestinian State
Source: Yehuda Ben Meir and Dafna Shaked, "The People Speak: Israeli Public
Opinion on National Security 2005-2007," The Institute for National Security
Studies, Memorandum no. 90 (May 2007): pp. 40.
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secular.111 Once more, the data suggest that Israel’s haredim are the most right-wing and 
non-pacifistic religious demographic in present-day Israel. 
 After studying this data, it is necessary to return to the primary thesis question of 
this research: why do the majority of young haredi males not serve in the IDF? There 
appears to be a major inconsistency between the opinions and rhetoric of the haredim and 
their actions. If 90 percent of the haredim oppose peace proposals and a further 59 
percent believe that there is a military solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, why 
have the numbers of exempted haredim skyrocketed over the decades? Is there some 
truth to the belief of many Jewish Israelis that the haredim are pushing Israel into a war 
in which they will not fight? 
   
Episodes of Haredi Violence  
 In present-day Israel, the haredi pacifistic tenets of old are not readily observable 
in their interactions with other Jewish Israelis. Because of the predominance of Zionist 
ideology in Israeli society, the haredim feel threatened by secular currents and believe 
that they are, in effect, “…constantly at war to defend [their] way of life.”112 Soon after 
Israeli independence, concrete signs of this war became manifest. The same man who 
spoke out against the Jewish resort to violence and war, Amram Blau, emerged as the 
leader of the Neturei Karta (“Guardians of the City”), a radical contingent of the haredi 
sect Eda Haredit. This sect declared: 
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God is our king and we are His servants. It is our obligation and calling to 
preserve His teaching, and since we do not recognize the rule of the 
infidels, because they are rebels against the kingdom of our Creator-King 
be blessed, it is forbidden to obey and work for a rebellious regime. Our 
Torah is our constitution and…under no condition can we respect their 
[the Zionists’] laws.113 
 
Blau firmly believed that he had an obligation to God to oppose the Israeli regime, and he 
instructed his followers to take a proactive approach in resisting the secularizing tide of 
Zionist ideology. Blau’s preferred method of resistance was protest. In the 1950s, he 
organized a succession of mass demonstrations in Jerusalem protesting Sabbath 
desecration. For five years, he and his followers harassed drivers who dared to pass 
through the haredi neighborhood of Mea Shearim on the Sabbath. When the police 
arrived to disperse the demonstrators, members of Neturei Karta escalated the fracas, 
sometimes violently. In the ensuing struggles, the police responded with mass beatings 
and arrests.114 Since then, thousands of radical haredim have turned out to protest 
countless Israeli projects in Jerusalem, most notably of which occurred in the 1980s, 
when they demonstrated against the excavation of ancient Hebrew Jerusalem in the City 
of David and the building of a Brigham Young University facility on the Mount of 
Olives.115 
 Over the years, haredi protests have become increasingly violent. No longer are 
their rallies confined to simple demonstrations. To be sure, their tactics have intensified 
to include riots, beatings, break-ins, rock throwing and firebombing.116 The most 
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egregious examples of haredi aggression transpired in the mid- to late- 1980s, when a 
young haredi yeshiva student named Yehuda Meshi-Zahav entered the scene. While Blau 
placed limits on the extent to which he actively opposed Zionism, Meshi-Zahav had no 
such conviction. As the ‘operations chief’ of the haredi activists, Meshiv-Zahav planned 
intricate assaults on Zionist targets. In 1986, he coordinated several attacks on bus stops 
in and around Jerusalem that featured profane advertisements depicting women in bikinis. 
Over 700 of his acolytes, which included members of Eda Haredit, the Satmar Hasidics 
and students of the Toldot Aharon yeshiva, raided 142 bus stops, completely destroying 
48 of them by fire.117 On February 9, 1989, Meshi-Zahav was arrested following 15 
attacks on Zionist targets between August 1988 and February 1989. During his 
interrogation, police suspected that Meshi-Zahav had formed a new group, Keshet (“a 
group that would not keep silent”), which was planning attacks of epic proportion. Their 
suspicion was confirmed when police discovered that Keshet had placed several 
explosives along the highway connecting Jerusalem and Tel-Aviv.118 Despite these 
crimes, Meshi-Zahav was eventually released, only to reappear at the site of a skirmish 
between border police and Palestinians during the al-Aqsa Intifada. Questioned by 
reporters as to the reason for his appearance, Meshi-Zahav replied that he was, 
“…observ[ing] new methods of fighting the Zionists.”119 
 Unlike Meshi-Zahav, who directed his assaults primarily at external targets, much 
violence exists within the haredi communities. This violence focuses on haredi 
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individuals who are perceived to be either actively engaged in sin and profanation or 
overly conciliatory to Zionist representatives and institutions. Two  examples are worth 
mentioning. The first example involves a group of haredim who are known as the 
mishmeret hazenu’it (sexual modesty guard). Not only does this group physically assault 
prostitutes in haredi neighborhoods, but it also interferes in the romantic relationships of 
unmarried haredi men and women who are seen together in public places. In many cases, 
the guard’s encounters with couples involve violent threats and beatings.120 The second 
example occurred in June 1984 when a large group of yeshiva students belonging to the 
Gur Hasidic sect attacked Menachem Porush, an ultra-Orthodox member of the Knesset. 
Porush, whom the students believed sympathized with Zionist members in the Knesset, 
was 60-years-old at the time of the attack. After the students battered him relentlessly, 
Porush was taken to the intensive care unit of a hospital where he remained for two 
weeks.121  
 Although Porush’s beating and Meshi-Zahav’s tactics are horrific, instances such 
as these are unique in the haredi world. By and large, haredi aggression is limited to 
protests and inflammatory rhetoric. This is principally because the haredim do, in fact, 
place an inherent value on Jewish life. Ehud Sprinzak contends that the haredim operate 
under a concept of ‘limited violence,’ “…based on the belief that Jewish life, including 
the life of the secular, is sacred and the killing of Jews is absolutely forbidden.”122 Due to 
a general compliance with this concept, no deaths have been ascribed to haredi violence, 
                                                
120 Friedman, “Haredi Violence,” 193-194. 
 
121 Sprinzak, Brother Against Brother, 107. 
 




and the cases of haredi violence resulting in life-threatening physical injuries are rare. 
Friedman adequately describes this phenomenon:  
Haredi [sic] society is clearly unusual in that the potential for violence 
within it does not culminate in bloodshed but rather is defined, 
circumscribed and controlled…by means of education that penetrates 
deeply into haredi [sic] consciousness.123  
 
Just as Amram Blau once instructed, the true Jewish believer does not pick up the sword. 
  
The Future of Haredi Violence  
 Notwithstanding the conventional taboo against violence, there are reasons to 
believe that there will be an escalation of haredi violence in the future. First, Israel has 
been building new haredi neighborhoods in the territories outside the limits of the ‘Green 
Line.’ Because these housing units are far cheaper than those in and around Jerusalem 
and more suited to the average haredi income, many haredi families have chosen to 
move into these neighborhoods and create new haredi communities. As residents of these 
controversial territories, the haredim may witness the extremist behavior of Israel’s 
settler communities and begin to emulate the settlers’ violent activities. Although the 
haredim do not share the same patriotic feelings as the national-religious settlers, they 
may nevertheless feel a certain obligation to protect the settlements through the use of 
violent force.124 Second, military exemptions for yeshiva students extend to ‘born-again’ 
Jews. In many cases, these newly religious individuals are criminals and delinquents who 
have not been inculcated with the demand for a strict adherence to haredi traditions. 
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Thus, these individuals have not been imbued with the traditional haredi concepts of 
restraint and limited violence. For the newly religious individuals who are especially 
zealous, their newfound religion may compel them to act out in a violent fashion against 
Zionist targets, if only so they may demonstrate proof of their total devotion to God.125 
Finally, the haredim are, for all intents and purposes, a fundamentalist group. As such, 
they share many of the same traits and tendencies with other religio-ideological 
fundamentalist groups, most notably Christian and Islamic. Unfortunately over the past 
three decades, the world has borne witness to the type of carnage that a religiously 
motivated fundamentalist group can wreak. To be sure, the haredim in Israel have never 
perpetrated acts of extreme terror or mass murder. However, the high frequency of 
religiously inspired attacks around the world leads many to speculate over the extent to 
which these acts of violence influence the haredim. Ultimately, Israel’s haredim may 
attempt to replicate these catastrophic acts of violence at some point in the future.126 
  
Conclusion  
 This chapter began by asking if haredi yeshiva students do not serve in the IDF 
because they are pacifists who reject all forms of violence. Through an examination of 
this hypothesis, evidence arose that both corroborated and contradicted this statement. 
The haredim began to exhibit anti-militaristic tendencies as early as Israel’s War for 
Independence, as most haredim believed that the Jewish people were ethically superior to 
those who practiced war, so they refused to take up arms and fight during this critical 
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period in Israel’s history. In addition, the haredim are the most right-wing religious 
demographic in present-day Israel. Not only do the haredim overwhelmingly reject peace 
overtures en masse, but they also endorse severe military actions to resolve the conflict 
with Israel’s neighbors. Furthermore, ample evidence revealed episodes of haredi 
communal violence directed outwardly at Zionist targets and inwardly at deviant 
haredim. Despite these incidents, this violence is characterized not by excess, but by 
restraint. As the haredim assign a precious value to all Jewish life, their violence usually 
stops short of extremes that result in death. This chapter ended by offering three reasons 
why haredi violence may escalate in the future. Although future violence is by no means 
imminent, the potential for it certainly exists.  
 In the final analysis, the haredi tradition of adherence to principles of non-
violence and pacifism seems to be a legitimate justification for yeshiva students’ 
avoidance of military service, and episodes of haredi violence appear to represent more 
of an aberration than the norm of traditional haredi values. At the same time, the data 
cannot be ignored, as it clearly illustrates a haredi community that does not necessarily 
evince a pacifistic political outlook. While it would be satisfying to believe that the 
haredi traditions of pacifism and non-violence extend to the political realm, evidence for 
this conclusion is lacking. The exceptionally hawkish haredi political opinions outlined 
in this chapter leaves no choice but to conclude that haredi yeshiva student military 












 The third and final hypothesis of this thesis claims that haredi yeshiva students do 
not serve in the IDF because Jewish religious law forbids military service. Militaries are 
institutions that are inherently tied to violent conflict. As such, military participation 
contravenes the yeshiva students’ quest for a spiritually pure and peaceful existence. To 
be sure, yeshiva students scrutinize religious texts in order to preserve historical and 
communal traditions. Moreover, their studies contribute to the maintenance of the 
righteous and unique characteristics of the Jews as a pacifistic people. However, after 
much analysis, the evidence for this hypothesis reveals that, in the context of 
contemporary Israeli society, yeshiva students possess a convoluted understanding of 
their role as religious scholars. In fact, haredi yeshiva students utilize militaristic 
terminology to describe their responsibilities. By referring to the Torah as a weapon and 
comparing the labor of a yeshiva student to that of a soldier, haredi yeshiva students 
project a notion that they represent a quintessential component participating in the 
physical protection of the Jewish people. In unpacking this notion, this chapter will show 
that the haredim base their belief in the protective power of the yeshiva student on a 
historical precedent dating back to the ancient Israelite people. It will then explain the 
ways in which the haredim assign war-like properties to the Torah and conclude by 
examining the concept that the yeshiva student is analogous to the IDF soldier. When this 
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chapter is finished, it will become clear that, through their studies, haredi yeshiva 




 Although the Jewish people trace their origins to a period of over three thousand 
years ago, their long history produced a relative paucity of literature relating to wars and 
soldiering. Before the establishment of the State of Israel, few Jewish guidelines for war 
and peace existed outside of the Tanakh. 127 Despite the abundance of wars throughout 
the Tanakh, there does appear to be a certain condemnation attached to bloodshed on the 
one hand and a call for pacifism on the other. For instance, in Deuteronomy 20:10-12, 
God commands Moses to search for peaceful options before he goes to war with enemy 
nations.  
When you march up to attack a city, make its people an offer of peace. If 
they accept and open their gates, all the people in it shall be subject to 
forced labor and shall work for you. If they refuse to make peace and they 
engage you in battle, lay siege to that city.128  
 
While it is not surprising to find references to slavery and slaughter in the Tanakh, this 
mention of peacemaking does stand out. It demonstrates that there is, in fact, an ancient 
Jewish standard for seeking peaceful resolutions to conflicts as great as war. Alongside 
this call to the Israelites to seek peace before going to war, God rebukes one of Judaism’s 
most revered figures for the carnage that he has caused. When King David is preparing to 
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build the First Jewish Temple in Jerusalem, God tells him that his history of violence has 
made him unworthy to construct this most holy site. As told in I Chronicles 22:8, God 
admonishes David, “You have shed much blood and have fought many wars. You are not 
to build a house for my Name, because you have shed much blood on the earth in my 
sight.”129 Perhaps there is not a more powerful motivation for a religious Jew to detest 
violence than this example. King David, who had conquered Jerusalem for the specific 
purpose of erecting an altar to worship God, was reproached by God for his excessive use 
of violence. For the haredi yeshiva student who actively seeks favor in the eyes of God, 
King David’s penalty is a compelling justification for avoiding military service. 
  
The Tribe of Levi 
 The most fascinating aspect of the Tanakh’s guidelines for war and soldiering is 
its description of the tribe of Levi. When Moses was leading the Israelites through the 
Sinai Desert, God commanded him to take a census of the entire Israelite community and 
assign every man who was at least twenty years old to a division in the army. At the same 
time, God instructed Moses that members of the tribe of Levi were to be excused from 
army service so that they could serve in a religious capacity. Numbers 1:47-53 recounts 
God’s command: 
The families of the tribe of Levi, however, were not counted along with 
the others. The Lord had said to Moses: ‘You must not count the tribe of 
Levi or include them in the census of the other Israelites. Instead, appoint 
the Levites to be in charge of the tabernacle of the Testimony – over all its 
furnishings and everything belonging to it…The Israelites are to set up 
their tents by divisions, each man in his own camp under his own 
standard. The Levites, however, are to set up their tents around the 
                                                




tabernacle of the Testimony so that the wrath will not fall on the Israelite 
community. The Levites are to be responsible for the care of the 
tabernacle of the Testimony.’130 
 
From this passage, it appears that the Tanakh places a spiritual and temporal duty on the 
tribe of Levi. In addition to its role as keepers of the Tabernacle, the Levites are charged 
with ensuring that ‘wrath’ does not touch the Israelites. Whether this ‘wrath’ comes from 
God or from enemy nations, it most certainly refers to physical harm.  
 For centuries, members of the tribe of Levi remained protected from military 
service. Even after the destruction of the Second Temple and the ensuing exile, 
descendents of this tribe played an important religious role in Jewish communities around 
the world. In today’s Israel, not every member of the haredi communities has a Levite 
ancestor. Nevertheless, they utilize this ancient model to defend their decision to eschew 
military service. Their rationale is found primarily in the works of the twelfth-century 
Jewish philosopher Maimonides, who examined this precedent and ruled that military 
exemptions should be expanded. He wrote: 
[The tribe of Levi was] separated for one task – to serve [in the Temple] 
and to teach His righteous ways…therefore they were separated from the 
ways of the world, and they do not wage war as do the other 
Israelites…Not only the tribe of Levi, but any individual whose spirit 
moves him to…separate himself to stand before G-d [sic] and to serve him 
[sic], to know Him…and he removes from his neck the yoke of 
considerations which most people see, behold this person becomes most 
holy.131 
 
With this edict, droves of haredim validate their non-service. Service to God sublimates 
service to the state. Their role as protectors of the faith is much more critical to the 
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security of the nation than all of the soldiers and weaponry of the military. Consequently, 
the haredi yeshiva student safeguards the Jewish people from the ‘wrath’ emanating from 
earthly and heavenly bodies. 
 The haredim sincerely believe that the study of the Torah and other divinely 
inspired texts has allowed the Jewish people to survive generations of exile and finally 
return to the land of their ancestors.132 From merciless persecution at the hands of their 
resident nations to the ultimate horror of the Holocaust, the only thing that has sustained 
the Jewish people throughout their collective tragedies was the work of a select number 
of Jews who remained unwaveringly committed to analyzing God’s Word. Drawing 
inspiration from this history, the haredim often refer to the yeshiva students in their 
community by commenting, “On his Torah is dependent the whole world.”133 While the 
haredi conception of the ‘whole world’ most likely excludes Gentiles, the 
aforementioned comment suggests that the fate of the Jewish world is inextricably tied to 
the extent to which the Jewish people devote their lives to unraveling the mysteries of 
God’s Word. Indeed, the study of the Torah, according to the haredim, is “…the only real 
guarantee to the protection and well-being of the Jewish people.”134 
  
The Role of Torah Study in Israel’s National Security 
 The protective power of Torah study is not limited only to the preservation of 
Jewish life. Despite their complex view of war and violence, the haredim also believe 
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that the activities of the Torah scholar play an instrumental role on the battlefield in 
modern-day Israel.135 Through his studies, the Torah scholar provides heavenly blessings 
that supplement the IDF. According to this logic, the IDF would never find victory in the 
field of battle without the work of yeshiva students. The haredim point to Psalms 127: 1 
for verification of this view. It reads,  “Unless the Lord watches over the city, the 
watchmen stand guard in vain.”136 The haredim believe that any action without God’s 
backing is meaningless and doomed to fail. For all of the effort that the IDF puts into 
defending the Jewish state, its endeavors are for naught unless its actions are undertaken 
with the belief that God is the ultimate reason that Israel will be able to vanquish its 
enemies. Torah study, then, becomes the means by which the Jewish people receive 
God’s help during times of tribulation. It is the “secret weapon of the people of Israel” 
that allows them achieve miraculous victories in war.137 The haredim point to the 
outcomes of the Six Day War and the Yom Kippur War as evidence, when against all 
odds, the IDF emerged victorious.138 Their work in the yeshivot contributed to Israel’s 
unprecedented successes on the battlefield during these conflicts. In sum, as Rabbi Shach 
once declared, “Other than the Torah we have no security; without it, neither soldiers nor 
the IDF will save us.”139 
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 Furthermore, the haredim believe that the losses Israel suffers on the battlefield 
are directly correlated to the societal currents in Israeli society. More accurately, the 
haredim contend that God punishes Israel for its lack of faith. For example, the First Gulf 
War marked the first time that Israelis felt vulnerable within the boundaries of Israel 
proper. Not counting the First Intifada or the shelling of Northern Israel during the 1980s, 
the First Gulf War ushered in a new era in which Israeli citizens no longer felt safe within 
the confines of the large cities along Israel’s coast. Never before had Israelis felt the 
devastating effects of war at home until Saddam Hussein’s Scud missiles began to rain 
down on Tel Aviv and Haifa. The haredim explained this phenomenon as a consequence 
of Israel’s rapid shift toward secularization. The First Gulf War was “a divine rebuke to 
the secular arrogance of contemporary Israel…God was reminding Israel that its rightful 
role is not in waging war but in faith in the eternal protective power of God.”140 Backing 
up this claim is the fact that the early 1990s witnessed a Labor-led government that 
appeared to be committed to reversing religious trends in the public square. According to 
Asher Arian and Michal Shamir, a pre-election survey in 1992 demonstrated that 29 
percent of Israelis “support[ed] public life according to Jewish religious law,” as opposed 
to 43-51 percent in earlier years.141 In essence, the haredim believe that Israel found itself 
under siege precisely because it was moving away from God. As a result, God allowed 
Israel’s enemies to wreak havoc on the Jewish people. No amount of soldiers or weapons 
could reverse this development. The only solution lay in returning to the folds of 
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traditional religious life. As the haredi Rabbi Menachem Zeev Maor once instructed, 
Israel had to find a way “…to mend the reason the enemies were sent by God.”142 The 
haredim, for their part, embrace this task. 
 In his acceptance of this mission, the haredi yeshiva student goes to war. He 
becomes a soldier in a different type of war – a war in which his pursuit of righteousness 
allows the Jewish people to enjoy the safety behind God’s shield. His involvement in this 
war is as important, if not more so, than the valorous sacrifice of the individual IDF 
soldier in the field. The war of the yeshiva student takes place in the spiritual realm, a 
venue where fighter jets and artillery have no utility.  
Whereas the [combat] soldier is involved with physical battles on various 
fronts, the Haredi [sic] ‘warrior’ is engaged in a difficult vocation and an 
arduous and never-ending war against physical desires…[H]e is engaged 
in a far more extensive war, shouldering the weight of prohibitions and 
taboos, fighting the evil inclination while adhering to the Torah.143 
 
In this capacity, the haredi yeshiva student becomes an ‘other-worldy’ soldier. He 
submits himself to service in a battle that has been fought since time immemorial, the 
metaphysical struggle between good and evil. He fights on behalf of the entire Jewish 
people, making certain that they do not unwittingly relinquish their spiritual anointing as 
God’s Chosen People.144 
 Due to their involvement in this spiritual conflict, the haredim justify non-
enlistment in the IDF by claiming that they split the burden of defense with their military 
counterparts. Haredi authorities employ military concepts to explain their reasoning. Like 
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any other unit of the military, they claim, yeshiva students must hone their craft without 
any deviation. In order for them to become experts in the field of Torah study, they must 
completely immerse themselves in their work and perfect their responsibilities through 
training and repetition. Rabbi Neugerschall writes,  
I am for integration, but don’t we need the sea commandos? The artillery? 
The armoured corps?...But can you be a pilot for one week and then you 
are off for another week? A week as a sea commando? Everyone 
understands that in this manner you will not have anything. The structure 
of the army is such that each unit has its own flag and soldiers…and the 
Torah is our weapon.145 
 
From this point of view, yeshiva students constitute their own division. If they are 
disturbed, for any reason, their value as spiritual ‘warriors’ suffers. Some haredi 
authorities even believe that yeshiva students add such an important component to 
defense that the IDF should attach soldiers to yeshivot to protect the students from all 
outside interference. “If the government knew how much [Torah] students protect the 
state’s well-being through their study, it would put guards in the schools, making sure 
that learning is never interrupted.”146 This statement reflects the haredi view that the 
Israeli government fails to appreciate exactly how much yeshiva students contribute to 
the protection of the State of Israel. Like the IDF, yeshiva students are an integral 
component in matters of national security. An analogy from a member of the Chief 
Rabbinate adequately sums up this belief: “It’s like any machine, even if you are missing 
one screw it can’t continue. One little screw can’t get up and say, ‘I am the most 
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important’ because you need all of the parts of the machine…everyone has his role.”147 It 
follows, then, that if haredi yeshiva students are conscripted, Israel’s entire defense 
‘machine’ will fail to function. 
  
Conclusion 
 This chapter has provided the religious and spiritual reasoning behind the haredi 
communities’ avoidance of military service. After much analysis, there is not enough 
evidence to conclude that Jewish religious law forbids military service. Nor is there 
sufficient evidence to safely determine that the Jewish religion is inherently pacifistic in 
nature. While there are scriptural examples depicting a traditional Jewish recourse to 
peace as well as a powerful contempt for excessive bloodshed, it is difficult to defend a 
conclusion that argues for a total Jewish rejection of violence. After all, the ancient 
Israelite people established their kingdom primarily at the tip of a sword. It is, however, 
safe to conclude that, from the perspective of the haredim, military service does present a 
problem for the yeshiva student’s quest for a spiritually pure and peaceful existence. As 
modern-day representatives of the tribe of Levi, haredi yeshiva students have one role: to 
serve God. Interruption of this duty, especially for the purpose of going to war, is strictly 
forbidden. At the same time, yeshiva students frequently refer to their studies and life-
style as a war. They are constantly at war to fend off spiritually malignant desires and 
temptations, and only their Torah studies successfully overcome these enemies. In so 
doing, they believe that they add an essential element to the defense of the Jewish people. 
Through their quest for righteousness and purity, haredi yeshiva students protect the 
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State of Israel and augment the IDF’s tactics in battle. Ultimately, this reasoning provides 
haredi yeshiva students both an excuse to avoid conscription and a case for inclusion into 
Israel’s body politic. Haredi yeshiva students do perform service to the State of Israel, a 




































 At the beginning of this paper, three hypotheses were offered with the intent to 
discover why haredi yeshiva students do not serve in the IDF. First, haredi yeshiva 
students do not serve in the IDF because they do not want to. After much research, there 
is compelling evidence to accept this argument. Because the majority of haredim are anti-
Zionist, they reject most Israeli institutions. In so doing, they believe that they remove 
themselves from the obligations incumbent upon Israeli citizens. Haredi yeshiva students 
also fear the repercussions of interrupting their studies to report for military service. If 
they choose to enlist, their efficacy as a scholar will be affected, secularizing forces will 
jade their worldview, and they will encounter resentment among their haredi brethren 
upon returning to the folds of traditional haredi life. As a result, young haredi males fear 
the societal repercussions attached to military service, so they choose not to enlist. 
 The second hypothesis suggested that haredi yeshiva students are political 
pacifists. It was learned that the tenets of pacifism have resonated in haredi communities 
long before the establishment of the State of Israel. It was also discovered that the haredi 
communities possess cultural taboos against violence. Even with these minor incidents of 
communal violence in past decades, the haredim exhibit an aversion to any action that 
results in major physical injury and/or death. Despite this tradition of pacifism, however, 
haredi public opinion is significantly hawkish and indisposed to the politics of peace. Not 
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only do they favor military solutions to conflict, but they also oppose non-violent 
remedies such as treaties and political settlements. Given such evidence, the hypothesis 
that the haredim avoid military service because they are intrinsically pacifistic must be 
refuted. 
 The final hypothesis surmised that haredi yeshiva students do not serve in the IDF 
because Jewish religious law forbids military service. There is no evidence in the 
research findings to support this hypothesis. Although the Tanakh instructs that members 
of the tribe of Levi are to be exempted from military service, it is inconceivable that 
every member of Israel’s haredi communities is a descendent of the Levites. 
Furthermore, haredi yeshiva students believe that, through their studies, they are engaged 
in a spiritual war, a role that complements actual IDF soldiers. Haredi scholars justify 
their non-enlistment by claiming that their work in the yeshivot has directly contributed 
to Israel’s major war victories. While the haredim may truly believe that their studies add 
an integral element to Israel’s national defense, there is no way to corroborate this claim. 
As such, this hypothesis must be rejected. Haredi yeshiva students can wage this spiritual 
battle just as effectively while serving in the IDF. In modern-day Israel, physical security 
ultimately outweighs spiritual security. 
 When this research question and its accompanying hypotheses were first unveiled, 
each argument was couched in terms informed by the principles of conflict resolution. 
However, after sifting through the research, there is no evidence to suggest that haredi 
yeshiva students avoid military service for any reason related to conflict resolution. 
Although it was concluded that the haredim simply do not want to serve in the IDF, they 
are motivated less by an aversion to violent conflict than by a fear of negative social 
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repercussions associated with military service and an antipathy for Zionist institutions 
and social constructs. Moreover, the evidence convincingly dispels the hypothesis that 
haredi yeshiva students justify non-service on the basis of pacifistic political beliefs. Far 
from projecting political opinions resembling anything close to support for peaceful 
conflict resolution methods, the haredim exhibit overwhelmingly hawkish and aggressive 
political attitudes. Finally, there is no concrete evidence to support the hypothesis that the 
haredim rely upon a Jewish religious tradition of conflict resolution to account for their 
non-service. The haredi yeshiva students reason that, instead of inducing them to search 
for peaceful solutions to conflict, their close adherence to Jewish religious tradition 
obliges them to pray for the success of the IDF on the battlefield by asking God to 
destroy Israel’s enemies. In sum, the results of the research clearly indicate that the 
haredim demonstrate little to no commitment to a peaceful resolution to the Israeli-
Palestinian conflict. Unfortunately, any hope that the haredim may serve as a peaceful 
model for other Jewish Israelis to emulate remains but a mere fantasy.  
 
The Future of Haredi Exemptions 
 In all likelihood, this policy will not be reversed any time soon. This is due to the 
fact that ultra-Orthodox haredi parties are firmly entrenched in the Knesset, and statistics 
indicate that their hold on political power will only strengthen in the coming years. A 
Central Bureau of Statistics survey, released in 2008, shows that in 2006, 7.5 percent of 
respondents, aged 20 and older, self-identified themselves as ultra-Orthodox.148 During 
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the same period, ultra-Orthodox political parties made up 15 percent (12 Shas MKs and 6 
United Torah Judaism MKs) of the Seventeenth Knesset, in session from 17 April 2006 
to 24 February 2009.149 Although this overrepresentation is staggering, demographic 
trends in the haredi communities are expected to push this disparity to further extremes. 
Haredi elementary school students comprise 25 percent of all Israeli elementary school 
pupils, and haredi secondary school students make up 20 percent.150 When these children 
reach voting-age, the haredi communities, “…will have an incontrovertible demographic 
advantage vis-à-vis the overwhelming majority of the Jewish electorate in Israel.”151 With 
this political power, it is difficult to envision any change in the current policy of haredi 
IDF exemptions. Barring an unexpected shift in haredi attitudes toward military service, 
the policy will continue as is, and future generations of haredi yeshiva students will 
represent a vast proportion of draft-age Jewish Israeli males unaffected by IDF 
conscription procedures. 
 Two strands of thought exist regarding this development. On one hand, some 
voices within the IDF argue that haredi recruits are not needed in the military. These 
voices stress that the IDF is already inundated with recruits, and it is finding it 
increasingly difficult to incorporate these draftees. At present, annual draft pools are 
flooded with ‘baby-boomers,’ born in the aftermath of the Yom Kippur War and 
currently reaching conscription age, as well as the influx of thousands of draft-age 
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immigrants from the former Soviet Union and Ethiopia.152 Moreover, there are signals 
from the IDF that is it considering terminating the policy of universal conscription 
altogether.153 On the other hand, high-ranking IDF officials vehemently deny the notion 
that the IDF does not need haredi recruits. Former IDF Chief of Staff Lt.-Gen. Dan 
Halutz argued that, “This phenomenon will not be able to continue for much longer for 
the simple reason that we will cross a line that without this critical number of recruits the 
defense establishment will not be able to fulfill its missions.”154 These officials complain 
that, due to the lack of draft-age recruits, reserve soldiers are bearing too much of the 
burden. The former head of the IDF Manpower Directorate, Maj.-Gen. Elazar Stern, 
wants to ease the burden of these reserve soldiers, since they are being called upon too 
frequently to report for combat duty. Stern would like to see reservists report only for 
training, as elongated combat duty interrupts their family and professional lives. In order 
to do this, Stern says, the IDF needs more draft-age recruits to perform compulsory 
service.155  
 At the present time, both of these arguments are valid, and it is impossible to 
accept either position given the evidence. What is certain, however, is that the 
controversy over haredi yeshiva student exemptions will remain volatile for the 
foreseeable future. Only a policy shift, either a move toward legitimate universal 
conscription or an end to it altogether, will assuage the tempestuous emotions engendered 
by this issue.  
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 If there is no change, the potential social repercussions of this policy are 
troubling, as the emotions surrounding it only serve to exacerbate an already tense 
relationship between the haredim and other segments of Jewish Israeli society. There 
exists a deep chasm between the political opinions of the haredim and the rest of the 
Jewish Israeli population, a split that poses an imminent threat to the stability of Israeli 
society. Not only do the haredim resist Israeli attempts to broker peace deals, but they 
also strive to impose their own version of Judaism on the rest of the population, an action 
that unambiguously aggravates non-haredi Jewish Israelis.  
…Non-religious Jews are confronted with a sector that is interested in 
more than maintaining its own well-being, and seeks to imprint its 
inclinations on the social order as a whole. The ultra-Orthodox are by no 
means ready to dismiss their self-image as holders of the “only” authentic 
Judaism, which, they firmly believe, should be abided by all Jews. As 
such, they definitely represent a conflictual factor of anti-status quo, 
aiming at the limitation of the non-religious’ freedom of action.156 
 
This combination of anti-peace political opinions and the burdensome attempt to enforce 
strict religious societal norms has set the haredi communities on a collision course with 
the majority of Jewish Israelis. As illustrated by an additional survey provided by Eliezer 
Ben-Rafael, the tension between these segments of society is authentic, and the potential 
for intra-Jewish conflict is all too real. Of the ultra-Orthodox respondents who were 
asked, “to what extent do you perceive tension between yourself and non-religious Israeli 
Jews?,” 69 percent answered that they perceived tensions, 47 percent of whom perceived 
sharp tensions (see Table 7). While these numbers are harrowing, the responses of the 
non-religious vis-à-vis the ultra-Orthodox present an even more ominous picture.  
 
                                                






Almost 90 percent of the non-religious respondents perceived tension, and 69 percent 
perceived sharp tensions.157 If these tensions remain unchecked, Israeli society could very 
well be torn asunder, and the Israeli-Palestinian conflict could persist interminably. How, 
then, can Jewish Israelis assuage these political and religious tensions so that Israel as a 
whole can approach the Israeli-Palestinian conflict as a united and confident front?  
 
A Practical Solution 
 Before closing, the proposition of a practical and relatively innocuous solution to 
this controversial issue is in order. This thesis has explained that neither the Nahal 
Haredi battalion nor the Tal Law has met the expectations with which they were initiated. 
Still, a model exists that may prove more successful in integrating increasing numbers of 
haredi young men into the IDF. The Hesder Yeshivot is the inspiration for this model. 
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       Table 7: Perceptions of Tensions between Religiosity Categories.
To what extent do you perceive tension between the following categories? (%)
Members of Categories Sharp Some No Number
vis-à-vis others Tensions Tensions Tension
Non-religious vis-à-vis 69 19 12 411
ultra-Orthodox
Ultra-Orthodox vis-à-vis 47 22 31 48
non-religious
Source: Eliezer Ben-Rafael, "The Faces of Religiosity in Israel:
Cleavages or Continuum?," Israel Studies 13, no. 3 (Fall 2008): 113.
 
93 
 Hesder Yeshivot (‘arrangement academies’) combine Torah study with military 
service. Beginning in 1965, then Prime Minister Levi Eshkol approved this project in an 
attempt to attract non-haredi religious men to service in the IDF. Much like the haredim, 
the rabbis of these young men feared the secularizing effects of the military and spoke 
out against military service.158 Nevertheless, Eshkol was able to strike a deal with these 
non-haredi rabbis in which the students who chose to serve in this arrangement would not 
be entirely removed from their religious life-style and studies. Students who choose this 
option agree to a five-year term of service.159 Upon enlistment at age 18, hesder students 
undergo a six-month period of basic training, after which they are allowed to leave the 
army and resume Torah studies at their yeshiva. For the next four-and-a-half years, 
hesder students are periodically called up, much like reserve soldiers, for active duty that 
does not exceed a total of sixteen months. During all periods of active duty, hesder 
students serve in completely homogeneous units, thus mitigating the dangerous influence 
of secular soldiers.160  
 Since the first experiment in 1965, Hesder Yeshivot have proven to be a rousing 
success. Currently, forty Hesder Yeshivot provide 1,200 annual recruits, totaling about 
6,000 hesder soldiers altogether.161 The vast majority of Torah scholars who choose to 
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serve within the hesder arrangement come from the National-Religious camp. Unlike the 
haredim, these religious young men embrace Zionism and fully believe in service to their 
country. The comments of one hesder student adequately demonstrate the differences in 
outlook between these young religious men and young haredi men. 
We advocate [military service] because we are convinced that, given our 
circumstances – would that they be better – military service is a mitzvah 
[commandment], and a most important one at that. Without impugning the 
patriotism and ethical posture of those who think otherwise, we feel that 
for the overwhelming majority of [Torah scholars], defense is a moral 
imperative.162 
 
In their zeal for the Zionist enterprise, many hesder units serve in some of the most 
intense combat situations. This eagerness to place their lives in the midst of such conflict 
is reflected in their total proportion of IDF fatalities during the Second Intifada. The 
distribution of combat deaths during this conflict reveal that the proportion of hesder 
soldiers killed is almost twice the rate of the whole Jewish Israeli male population.163 As 
unfortunate as this statistic is, it certainly speaks to the success of the Hesder Yeshivot. 
 Because the Hesder Yeshivot project is associated with the National-Religious 
movement, haredi yeshiva students are most likely not suited for it. Yet, if the IDF 
initiated a similar project based in haredi traditions, the results may ease the tensions 
surrounding the policy of haredi yeshiva student exemptions. In order for this project to 
work, however, the new haredi military framework must allow haredi young men to 
enlist in the IDF at the age of 18. One of the major shortcomings of the Tal Law is that 
the ‘decision year’ allows haredi yeshiva students to postpone their decision to enlist, 
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work or remain in the yeshiva until the age of 22, when they are most likely to be married 
with children.164 With large families to support and already well entrenched in the haredi 
community, these young men do not have the freedom to make the decision to leave the 
confines of the haredi world and experience life outside its walls. In spite of this, there is 
reason to believe that future generations of young haredi men may not be as anti-
enlistment as their older community leaders. As Israel grows older and the ‘travesty’ of 
the establishment of an un-messianic Jewish state fades into memory, younger 
generations of haredim may begin to relinquish the anti-Zionist attitudes maintained by 
older generations. This may result in an increasing acceptance of the State of Israel as 
well as a rise in the number of young haredi males who feel an obligation to participate 
in the nation’s defense. An option to enlist at the age of 18 may be a major catalyst in 
fostering this change. 
 Should young haredi men choose this path, they would have two primary options. 
First, they could join a revamped version of the Nahal Haredi battalion if they wished to 
uphold their religious and communal traditions. The new version of Nahal would closely 
mirror the Hesder Yeshivot, comprising an initial six-month term of training followed by 
a four-and-a-half year combination of Torah study and active military service. Nahal 
units would remain segregated by gender, and the soldiers would be offered daily 
opportunities to study and pray. In addition, they would be allowed frequent opportunities 
to contact their community rabbis. In this scenario, military service may eventually come 
to represent a powerful act of worship, much like it already does for National-Religious 
soldiers. The second option would be to join a regular IDF battalion. As it stands now, 
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young haredi men encounter few prospects for escaping the confines of their 
communities. Enlistment in a battalion made up of secular and non-haredi religious 
soldiers would offer an opportunity to experience a new way of life. At 18-years-old, 
these young haredim would encounter fresh perspectives from non-haredi Israelis that 
may encourage them to break out of the walls of parochial haredi life in order to find 
their own unique path. The lasting bonds formed and the lessons learned in the IDF 
would equip these young haredim with the tools necessary to lead a life all their own, 
unimpeded by the restrictions and taboos that characterize haredi communities. Either 
option is promising. In the end though, the IDF cannot wait until young haredi men are 
well established in their communities. It must reach them at the impressionable and 
carefree age of 18. 
 
Limitations 
 The data used in this thesis are limited by the low numbers of haredim who are 
willing to participate in surveys. Although the public opinion statistics in this thesis 
include haredi voices, they are not fully representative of all haredi communities, as in 
each survey, the proportion of haredi respondents to all other respondents is considerably 
lower than the actual proportion of haredim to the rest of Jewish Israeli society. If a 
higher proportion of haredim had participated in these surveys, the results may have 
revealed political opinions that differed from the conclusions put forward in this thesis.  
 Moreover, an extensive series of in-depth interviews would have certainly added 
an important dimension to this thesis. Yet, interviews with haredim can be problematic. 
As noted by several researchers who have attempted to penetrate Israel’s haredi 
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communities for the purpose of conducting research, members of the haredi 
communities, by and large, shy away from interviews with non-haredi researchers. Even 
if a haredi individual consents to an interview, his/her comments must necessarily be 
analyzed with caution. Due to the extent of social control that haredi authorities exercise 
over their communities, it is reasonable to suspect that haredi responses may represent an 
official position rather than an honest individual opinion. For this reason, a diversity of 
viewpoints may not become apparent, as may have certainly been the case in the previous 
chapter that analyzed the comments of haredi yeshiva students regarding their role in 
Israel’s national security. There may indeed exist a haredi yeshiva student who disagrees 
with the notion that his religious studies contribute to Israel’s battlefield victories, but he 
may be too intimidated to say so. This also extends to other popular haredi beliefs, 
including the official haredi position on military service. There is reason to suspect that a 
haredi young man would find it difficult to admit to a personal desire to serve in the IDF. 
If he did confess to such a desire and his peers found out, he may well be expelled from 
the haredi world. Notwithstanding these problems associated with haredi interviews, this 
method of research would have undoubtedly provided this thesis with an opportunity to 




 The emphasis of any future research should be on the conclusions derived from 
the first hypothesis, focusing specifically on the reasons why haredi young men do not 
want to serve in the IDF. To start, an original study should be conducted that seeks to 
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gauge the attitudes of younger generations of haredim to Zionism. As was explained in 
this thesis, older generations of haredim possess a strong antipathy to Zionism, which has 
partly contributed to their refusal to serve in the military. What is unclear is to what 
extent this hostility has passed down to younger generations. After all, the younger 
generations were not alive to witness the “catastrophe” that was the establishment of the 
State of Israel. If younger generations of haredim display a more amenable attitude 
toward Zionism, this particular justification for non-service may not only lose much of its 
influence over haredi young men, but it may also signify the beginning of a closer haredi 
relationship to the state.  
 In addition, further research should be conducted to analyze the experience of 
haredi soldiers in the Nahal Battalion. This effort should seek to determine if these 
“soldier-scholars” have suffered negative social and/or spiritual repercussions as a result 
of their decision to serve in the IDF. Questions relating to the justifications for non-
service should include: How have your friends and family members reacted to your 
decision to serve in the IDF? Are the prospects for finding a suitable haredi wife any 
different now that you have joined the IDF? How has military service affected your 
Torah studies? How has military service affected your relationship with God? Although 
this thesis has recounted many of the justifications that haredi young men point to as a 
reason for not serving, this further research would make it possible to gauge the extent to 
which these justifications are grounded in reality. By performing a study on the haredim 
who decide to enlist in the IDF, this further research could satisfactorily determine if 
negative social and spiritual repercussion do, in fact, befall the haredi young man who 
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